The Escalation of Violence in Generation Z and Generation Alpha Social Movements

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Introduction: A New Paradigm of Youth Contention

Over the past decade, a profound transformation has occurred in the nature of global civil disobedience, characterized by the emergence of Generation Z (born 1997–2012) and the nascent vanguard of Generation Alpha (born 2012–onward) as the primary engines of political contention1. Far from the media stereotypes of the early 2020s that characterized these cohorts as apathetic, withdrawn, or immobilized by digital consumption and "quiet quitting," these demographics have proven to be an unconventional and highly combustible political force1. From the anti-corruption uprisings that successfully toppled governments in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Madagascar, to the explosive urban riots in France and the United Kingdom, to the heavily fortified campus encampments in the United States, youth-led mobilizations are dictating the pace of global political disruption1. However, a critical pattern has emerged across these disparate geographic and cultural theaters: a distinct and increasing propensity for these protests to escalate into physical violence, property destruction, and direct, militarized clashes with state security apparatuses1. The shift away from strictly enforced nonviolent discipline—a hallmark of late-twentieth-century civil rights and democratization movements—requires a multidimensional sociological analysis12. The violent escalation of Generation Z and Generation Alpha protests cannot be attributed to a single variable, nor can it be dismissed as mere youthful indiscretion. Rather, it is the predictable, systemic outcome of compounding institutional failures. This violent trajectory is driven by the structural collapse of the modern democratic social contract, the psychological metastasis of cultural nihilism and "doomerism," the unprecedented speed of algorithmic "third-generation" radicalization, the inherent vulnerabilities of decentralized and leaderless organizing structures, and the increasingly aggressive, militarized posture of state security forces1. This report provides an exhaustive examination of these intersecting vectors, demonstrating why contemporary youth protests are increasingly abandoning traditional institutional channels in favor of confrontational, and frequently violent, direct action.

Structural Precarity and the Collapse of the Social Contract

To understand the latent fury underpinning modern youth mobilization, it is necessary to examine the material conditions in which Generation Z and Generation Alpha are coming of age. The modern democratic social contract, rooted in the Enlightenment philosophies of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, dictates that citizens surrender certain freedoms and adhere to collective laws in exchange for collective security and economic prosperity1. For previous generations, prosperity was defined by the baseline expectation that education and honest labor would yield economic mobility, homeownership, and familial stability1. For the contemporary youth cohort, this contract is viewed as irredeemably broken. They have largely kept their end of the bargain; Generation Z is the most highly educated generation in human history, yet the global economic system has failed to deliver commensurate rewards1. This structural precarity creates a baseline of existential anxiety that rapidly translates into political rage, particularly as central banks, governments, and universities continue to ignore the structural arithmetic of generational decline in favor of protecting asset prices and older voters1.

The financialization of real estate—where properties are hoarded as investment assets rather than utilized as residential infrastructure—has created a self-reinforcing cycle of asset inflation that prices out the young1. The combination of these factors guarantees that young people feel they possess no vested stake in the survival of the current economic order. When populations feel structurally excluded from the benefits of a society, the normative barriers preventing the destruction of that society's property and infrastructure naturally erode. Furthermore, this economic precarity has taken a quantifiable psychological toll. Meta-analyses of 9.2 million US adults between 1993 and 2020 demonstrate sharp increases in poor mental health, with the steepest rise in clinical anxiety and depression occurring among individuals aged 18 to 251. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention confirms that this demographic reports the highest prevalence of psychiatric distress, which declines with age1. Consequently, fertility rates have plummeted to record lows across developed economies, and young adults are actively delaying or abandoning family formation1. The psychological burden of navigating a collapsing economic paradigm provides the volatile emotional foundation upon which violent political action is built.

Gerontocracy, Corruption, and Political Exclusion

Compounding severe economic exclusion is a profound sense of political disenfranchisement. Across the globe, youth populations are governed by aging cohorts of political elites—gerontocracies that are starkly out of touch with the lived realities of the average citizen12. This demographic disconnect fosters a perception that formal institutional politics are unresponsive, exclusionary, and designed solely to protect incumbent power structures. Consequently, corruption has emerged as the primary rallying cry for the global wave of Generation Z protests12. The blatant hypocrisy of political and economic elites reaping opulent privileges while ordinary citizens suffer has proven to be an explosive catalyst for unrest12. This dynamic is consistently observed across vastly different geopolitical contexts:

• Nepal: Mass public outrage was triggered by viral images of wealthy "nepo kids" flaunting luxury gifts while the nation grappled with 20 percent youth unemployment. The resulting protests in late 2024 and 2025 led to the burning of the parliament building and the eventual ouster of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli12.
• Indonesia: Violent demonstrations erupted over the revelation that lawmakers received monthly housing allowances vastly exceeding the national minimum wage, alongside protests regarding food poisoning in a government school meals program12.
• Madagascar: Under the banner of "Gen Z Madagascar" (Gen Z Mada), extended electricity and water shortages in 2025 undermined daily survival, prompting youth to mobilize. Their demands quickly morphed from infrastructure repairs to calls for the resignation of corrupt officials who allowed the grid to fail while elites remained insulated1. The unrest culminated in a military mutiny by the elite CAPSAT unit, forcing President Andry Rajoelina to flee the country in October 20251.
• Serbia: The fatal collapse of a recently renovated railway station roof in Novi Sad in 2024, which killed sixteen people, sparked violent protests aimed at government negligence and corrupt infrastructure contracts tied to the Belt and Road Initiative3.
• Peru: Ongoing youth protests have demanded justice for rampant criminal extortion and violence, blaming blatant government complicity with organized crime and a controversial pension law3.
• The Philippines: Public demonstrations coalesced in September 2025 after a government report revealed that more than $2 billion meant for flood-relief projects had been lost to corruption12.
• Morocco: A leaderless collective known as "Gen Z 212" (named after the nation's dialing code) mobilized to protest against a 35 percent youth unemployment rate and to demand better public services, resulting in violent clashes with security forces and thousands of arrests12.

In each of these instances, the youth view the political class not as legitimate authorities to be negotiated with, but as a parasitic entity to be excised3. Because young people are deeply disillusioned by established, corrupt political parties that systematically exclude them, they are highly skeptical of formal political processes12. This complete loss of institutional trust is highly correlated with violent protest tactics; if electoral politics and the judiciary are perceived as corrupt extensions of the ruling class, extra-legal street action—including riots, arson, and the physical occupation of government spaces—is rationalized as the only viable mechanism for demanding accountability20.

The Psychology of Unrest: Cultural Nihilism and the Doomer Ethos

A nuanced understanding of contemporary youth violence requires examining the psychological metastasis of the aforementioned structural failures. This psychological distress has birthed a distinct ideological framework among marginalized youth, frequently termed "cultural nihilism" or "doomerism"14. Unlike the radical youth movements of the 1960s—which were often animated by utopian visions of civil rights, anti-imperialism, or socialist restructuring—a significant subset of contemporary youth protests is driven by a dystopic worldview14. Cultural nihilism represents a deep, ontological rejection of established social norms, rooted in the belief that the foundations of modern society are inherently baseless, corrupt, and beyond repair23. In epidemiological surveys of adolescents at risk of ideologically motivated violence, researchers note a concerning shift away from traditional, organized political ideologies14. Violence is increasingly non-ideological; it is not deployed strategically to achieve a specific political concession, but rather as an end in itself—an ontological striving for destruction14. Clinical data indicates that among adolescents attracted to nihilistic violence, stress-related disorders are the most frequent diagnosis, with family and school grievances at the forefront of documented adversities14. For youth immersed in these "doomer" subcultures, the glorification of violence, martyrdom, and societal collapse serves as a dark coping mechanism for profound despair and a perceived lack of a future14. This is evidenced by the alarming surge in ideologically motivated hate incidents among adolescents, including the non-ideological glorification of mass shooters and school shootings14. When this localized, psychological nihilism scales up into mass political movements, it heavily degrades the nonviolent discipline that historically sustained democratic transitions. Because the youth harbor a deep-seated belief that the system has failed them, they do not feel obligated to protect its physical manifestations. Rioters are less concerned with preserving the physical infrastructure of a society they believe has already abandoned them, explaining the rampant property damage, looting, and arson that frequently accompany these mobilizations14. The transition from traditional political reform movements to expressions of cultural nihilism means that the goal is often the disruption of the status quo itself, rather than the implementation of a specific policy alternative.

The Digital Accelerator: Third-Generation Radicalization

The translation of structural grievance and cultural nihilism into kinetic, real-world violence is exponentially accelerated by the contemporary digital ecosystem. The evolution of online radicalization is generally delineated by terrorism scholars into three distinct generations:

1. First Generation (1984–2000): Characterized by early, static websites, email lists, and basic forums where extreme ideologies were slowly disseminated. During this era, "hate went online," utilizing primitive mechanisms for propaganda27.

2. Second Generation (2000–2010): The advent of mainstream social media (Facebook, YouTube, early Twitter), which facilitated the global networking of disparate extremist groups and made radical propaganda highly accessible27.

3. Third Generation (2010–present): The current paradigm, defined by algorithmic amplification, short-form video content (TikTok, Instagram Reels), encrypted messaging (Telegram), and hyper-fragmented, gamified subcultures15.

Generation Z and Generation Alpha are the exclusive subjects of this third-generation radicalization15. The speed of indoctrination in this era is unprecedented. The average timeline for radicalization has contracted from years or months down to a matter of weeks, propelled by the exploitation of adolescent developmental vulnerabilities and constant exposure to hyper-stimulating, emotionally charged content29. This digital ecosystem has given rise to profound ideological fluidity and hybridization. Traditional boundaries between left-wing, right-wing, and religious extremism have blurred into grievance-based, anti-institutional amalgams30. Analysts have documented the rise of "Com networks"—decentralized online communities of predominantly teenage boys who engage in coordinated digital harassment, swatting, and the promotion of real-world violence, entirely divorced from coherent political philosophies30. In these spaces, young white supremacists may venerate Islamic State tactics, while Salafi-jihadists leverage the aesthetics of the extreme right, united only by a shared ethos of violent nihilism31. The power of this digital acceleration to foment immediate, physical violence was starkly illustrated during the summer 2024 riots in the United Kingdom5. Following the tragic fatal stabbing of three children in Southport on July 29, online disinformation rapidly circulated across third-generation platforms, falsely identifying the attacker as a Muslim asylum seeker5. (The attacker was later identified as Axel Rudakubana, a 17-year-old born in Wales to Rwandan parents, but the facts did nothing to deter the mobs5). Within hours, far-right networks, anti-immigrant agitators, and disaffected youth mobilized into violent mobs, attacking mosques, immigrant housing, and police personnel5. Highlighting the extreme youth involvement driven by digital networks, the youngest individual convicted for violent disorder in these riots was just 12 years old5. He was sentenced to a 12-month intensive referral order at a Manchester youth court for his participation in the violence, which was instigated almost entirely via online rumor34. By August 2024, over 927 people had been arrested and 466 charged in connection with the UK riots, demonstrating how rapidly third-generation digital platforms can translate online grievance into widespread physical destruction5. Furthermore, governments' attempts to manage this digital mobilization frequently backfire. In attempts to quell unrest, governments in Bangladesh and Nepal implemented complete internet blackouts or banned major social media platforms3. Rather than suppressing the protests, these heavy-handed censorship tactics were perceived by the youth as intolerable authoritarian overreach, acting as immediate catalysts for even greater violence and serving as the final tipping point for the ouster of both nations' prime ministers3.

Structural Vulnerabilities: Leaderless Movements and the Failure of "Internal Brakes"

While digital platforms excel at rapidly mobilizing mass populations, they inherently foster decentralized, "leaderless," or horizontally structured protest movements12. Protests in Kenya, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, and Madagascar have all been characterized by their lack of formal leadership cadres or institutional hierarchies1. While this structure offers distinct tactical advantages—making it impossible for authoritarian regimes to easily decapitate a movement by arresting a single figurehead—it presents a catastrophic vulnerability regarding the regulation of violence12. Without recognized leaders to negotiate with authorities, define movement goals, or enforce a strict code of conduct, maintaining nonviolent discipline becomes nearly impossible12. Decades of civil resistance research demonstrates that nonviolent campaigns are historically twice as likely to succeed as violent ones because they attract broader societal participation, create diverse pro-democracy coalitions, and reduce the legitimacy of state repression12. However, nonviolent discipline requires intense training, hierarchy, and enforcement mechanisms that are entirely absent in Gen Z movements. In the absence of leaders, decentralized movements attempt to self-regulate through what political scientists term "internal brakes"10. Extensive research by Samson Yuen into the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Movement provides the premier framework for understanding this dynamic10. Through content and statistical analysis of LIHKG—an influential online discussion forum utilized by protesters—Yuen identified that protesters attempt to establish normative boundaries around violence through discursive reasoning10. These internal brakes generally fall into four primary subtypes based on their normative logic:

1. Proportionality: Arguing that the level of violence used by protesters must not exceed the level of force deployed by the police10.

2. Conditionality: Stating that violence is only justified under specific, defensive circumstances, rather than as a preemptive offensive tactic10.

3. Consequentiality: Warning that excessive property damage or extreme physical assault will alienate the moderate public, invite overwhelming military repression, or destroy vital international support10.

4. Moral Sanity: Appealing to the fundamental humanity of the protesters to prevent the movement from devolving into sheer barbarism or losing its moral high ground10.

Yuen's research demonstrates that the salience of these brakes depends heavily on contextual factors, including the target scope, the predictability of the violence, and its overall severity10. However, the critical failure of contemporary Gen Z and Gen Alpha movements is that these internal brakes routinely collapse under the pressure of sustained state repression and the chaotic reality of street-level conflict10. Because digital consensus is fragile and ephemeral, radical factions within a decentralized movement can easily override moderate voices10. If a small, highly aggressive vanguard decides to engage in heavy violence—such as arson, the destruction of private property, or physical assault (often termed a "radical flank")—the broader, leaderless movement possesses no hierarchical mechanism to expel them or curtail their actions10. The violence then becomes predictable, targets expand outward from government buildings to civilian businesses, and the protest irrevocably transitions into a riot10. The structural inability to enforce these internal brakes is a primary reason why modern youth protests are increasingly characterized by rapid tactical radicalization and violent escalation10.

State Repression and the Normalization of Asymmetric Violence

Youth violence does not exist in a vacuum; it is highly interactive with, and frequently a direct reaction to, the tactics of state security forces. Autocratic regimes, flawed democracies, and advanced liberal democracies alike tend to view youth mobilization as exceptionally threatening, frequently responding with disproportionate and intense police militarization12. When peaceful assemblies are ignored, and militant assemblies are met with rubber bullets, chemical agents, and live ammunition, the youth internalize the lesson that force is the only language the state comprehends11.

The French Riots (2023): A Crisis of Policing and Marginalization

The dynamics of state violence and youth reprisal were violently demonstrated during the summer 2023 riots in France. The unrest was triggered on June 27 when a 17-year-old boy of Algerian and Moroccan descent, Nahel Merzouk, was shot and killed at point-blank range by police during a traffic stop in the Parisian suburb of Nanterre4. A video of the execution-style killing rapidly went viral, invalidating initial police claims that the car was driving toward them, and instantly igniting the marginalized banlieues (working-class suburbs)42. The response from the youth was catastrophic. Over consecutive nights, rioters torched over 2,000 vehicles, damaged nearly 500 public buildings (including town halls and schools), started 3,880 fires, and engaged in intense street battles with police across Paris, Marseille, and Lyon4. The French government responded by deploying 45,000 heavily armed police, gendarmes, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers4. Crucially, the demographic profile of the rioters underscored the generational nature of the crisis: the average age of the thousands arrested was just 17 years old, with many combatants as young as 12 and 134. Sociological analysis points to years of state neglect, systemic racism, and the frequent use of discriminatory identity checks as the structural kindling for the riots26. Furthermore, incendiary rhetoric from top government officials, including Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin's use of the racially coded term ensauvagement (suggesting the nation was turning "savage"), signaled to law enforcement that aggressive tactics against minority youth were permissible, further alienating the generation42. The uprising in Nanterre drew immediate comparisons to the historic May 1968 student-worker protests that also began at Paris Nanterre University; however, where 1968 was led by relatively privileged university students, the 2023 uprising was led by the nation's most severely marginalized and impoverished young teenagers42. When the state treats youth as an inherently hostile occupying force, the youth adopt the tactics of urban insurgency in response.

US Campus Protests (2024): Outsourced and Sanctioned Violence

The normalization of violence against youth was also evident in a vastly different context: the 2024 pro-Palestinian university encampments in the United States. At the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), students constructed a fortified, generally nonviolent encampment in Dickson Plaza to demand divestment from military contractors45. However, the situation escalated into severe violence not due to the student protesters, but due to a failure of the state to protect them, followed by state-sanctioned militarized clearance6. On the night of April 30, just before 11:00 PM, a mob of over 100 masked counter-protesters—many unassociated with the university—stormed the encampment6. The attackers announced their presence by blasting audio of screaming babies from loudspeakers, then deployed strobe lights, bear spray, firecrackers, and physical beatings using pipes and wooden poles against the students6. Despite the severe escalation, campus security retreated inside buildings, and external law enforcement (LAPD and California Highway Patrol) failed to intervene for nearly three hours, allowing the vigilante violence to persist unimpeded11. Protesters were forced to engage in physical "community defense" simply to survive the assault45. Subsequently, rather than solely pursuing the vigilantes who initiated the violence, the university administration utilized the ensuing chaos as justification to declare the student encampment an illegal assembly6. In the early morning hours of May 2, hundreds of riot-clad police officers moved in, utilizing flash-bang grenades and firing impact munitions (rubber bullets) to forcibly dismantle the camp, resulting in over 200 arrests of students and faculty6. This incident demonstrates a critical driver of youth radicalization: the perception of profound institutional hypocrisy. When state security forces allow right-wing or counter-protester violence to occur with impunity, yet deploy overwhelming militarized force to suppress progressive youth organizing, it strips the state of its moral monopoly on violence40. Youth movements, recognizing that the state will neither protect them nor respect their civil liberties, increasingly conclude that physical fortification, militant self-defense, and tactical escalation are necessities for survival.

Lethal Repression in the Global South

In the Global South, the state response to youth protests is frequently lethal, accelerating the transition from civil disobedience to revolutionary violence.

• Bangladesh (2024): Student protests demanding reforms to a civil-service quota system were met with a brutal government crackdown. Security forces killed an estimated 1,400 people1. Rather than suppressing the movement, the mass killings eliminated any possibility of peaceful resolution. The youth demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, eventually ransacking her official residence and forcing her to flee the country in August 2024, marking what many label the world's first successful Gen Z revolution1.
• Kenya (2024): Decentralized, youth-led protests against proposed tax hikes and corruption (the "Occupy Parliament" movement) were met with tear gas, water cannons, and live ammunition, resulting in dozens of deaths1. The violence was compounded by the extrajudicial abduction of young activists by security forces12. While President William Ruto eventually conceded to some demands, the violence permanently radicalized a segment of the youth population1.

Generation Alpha: Pragmatic Resistance and the Future of Contention

As Generation Z continues to define the current era of global protest, the older cohorts of Generation Alpha (those born post-2012, currently entering early high school) are rapidly being integrated into these movements2. Generation Alpha is unique in that they are the first generation entirely born after the widespread adoption of the smartphone, possessing an unprecedented level of digital immersion20. Furthermore, their formative developmental years have been completely defined by overlapping macro-crises: the trauma and isolation of the COVID-19 pandemic, severe political polarization, ubiquitous school shootings (in the US context), and the omnipresent dread of climate collapse2. Sociological indicators suggest that Generation Alpha approaches activism with a distinct pragmatism, diverging slightly from the abstract ideological battles of the past. In the African context, scholars have observed that Generation Alpha is fundamentally redefining concepts like "patriotism"55. Where older generations viewed patriotism as unwavering, unquestionable loyalty to the state or a flag, Generation Alpha views it as a demand for measurable societal improvement—such as clean water, reliable power, fair elections, and functional institutions55. Their loyalty is to the welfare of their community and the values of fairness, not to the governments that have repeatedly betrayed them55. A young Alpha will criticize inefficient local services not out of hatred for the government, but out of a desire for reformation55. Crucially, Generation Alpha does not view authority as immutable. They are inheriting the legacy of movements like the October 2020 \#EndSARS protests in Nigeria, which demonstrated how decentralized, digitally coordinated youth could force the disbandment of abusive police units by making their misbehavior a global spectacle55. Having witnessed the successful (if chaotic) regime overthrows led by Gen Z in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Madagascar, Generation Alpha understands that entrenched power structures can be dismantled through collective willpower and technological ingenuity1. While early analyses suggest a desire among Alpha activists to achieve progress without total societal destruction—a slight divergence from the darkest extremes of Gen Z nihilism—they are completely desensitized to conflict2. Because every instance of police brutality, political hypocrisy, or institutional failure is instantly recorded, consumed, and algorithmically targeted to them, the narrative of their citizenship is actively constructed around resistance2. As they transition into the primary demographic of mass mobilization over the next decade, their native fluency in third-generation digital tactics, combined with an inherited expectation of institutional failure, suggests that the baseline intensity of future protests will remain exceptionally high27.

Conclusion

The escalation of violence within Generation Z and Generation Alpha protests represents a fundamental, likely permanent, realignment of global political contention. The empirical evidence clearly indicates that this trend is not a temporary anomaly, but a structural inevitability born from the intersection of economic collapse, technological acceleration, and institutional rigidity. First, the macroeconomic environment has effectively locked a vast swath of the global youth population out of the traditional pathways to security and wealth1. The resulting psychological toll—manifesting in rising rates of depression, anxiety, and a pervasive cultural nihilism—has created a demographic cohort that feels it has nothing to lose by dismantling the current system, often prioritizing disruption over specific policy outcomes1. Second, the transition to third-generation digital environments has drastically reduced the friction of radicalization. Grievances are no longer localized; a police shooting in France, a corruption scandal in Nepal, or a policy failure in Kenya are instantly globalized, allowing decentralized movements to share tactics, rhetoric, and a unified anti-institutional identity across borders3. However, these decentralized, leaderless structures are inherently incapable of enforcing the "internal brakes" necessary to maintain nonviolent discipline during moments of high tension, leading to rapid tactical radicalization10. Finally, the reliance of modern states on militarized policing to manage what are fundamentally social, economic, and political crises guarantees reciprocal violence40. When peaceful assemblies are ignored, and militant assemblies are met with rubber bullets, chemical agents, and live ammunition, the youth internalize the lesson that force is the only language the state comprehends11. As Generation Alpha matures and fully inherits this fractured geopolitical landscape, their pragmatic, conflict-adapted worldview will likely sustain this heightened tempo of unrest2. Unless governments, institutions, and economic systems can effectuate massive structural reforms to address wealth inequality, political corruption, and youth disenfranchisement, violent protest will remain the default mechanism for demographic leverage in the 21st century.

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41. French President Emmanuel Macron did not ban social media during protests \- PolitiFact, https://politifact.com/factchecks/2023/jul/14/instagram-posts/french-president-emmanuel-macron-did-not-ban-socia/

42. France: Anti-Police Uprising of Marginalized Youth Hurls Challenge to the Entire Social Order | Section on Marxist Sociology, https://marxistsociology.org/2023/11/france-anti-police-uprising-of-marginalized-youth-hurls-challenge-to-the-entire-social-order/

43. 'Stop rioting, stop destroying': victim's grandmother calls for calm in France \- The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/02/france-riots-quieter-night-reported-across-the-country-despite-close-to-500-arrests

44. France braces for new violence as teen laid to rest \- The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/france-braces-for-new-violence-as-teen-laid-to-rest/article67032353.ece

45. Police let violent mobs attack UCLA students. This is what lawlessness looks like | Judith Levine | The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/commentisfree/article/2024/may/06/ucla-protester-mob-attack

46. November 5, 2024 \- City of Los Angeles, https://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/110524/BPC\_24-285.pdf

47. UCLA Campus Protests, https://alumni.ucla.edu/campus-protests/

48. Gen Z protests \- Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gen\_Z\_protests

49. Political views of Generation Z \- Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political\_views\_of\_Generation\_Z

50. French riot deja vu is raising the stakes for Macron \- The Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/07/05/commentary/world-commentary/france-riots/

51. 2026-2029 Amnesty International USA Youth Strategy, https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/2026-2029-AIUSA-Youth-Strategy.pdf

52. San José youth cultivate activism – Spartan Media Group, https://spartanmediagroup.net/4527/spartan-daily/san-jos-youth-cultivate-activism/

53. From Tweets to Streets: How Kenya's Generation Z (Gen Z) is Redefining Political and Digital Activism, https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1218\&context=acist

54. Meet Gen Z activists: Called to action in an unsettled world \- AP News, https://apnews.com/article/climate-race-and-ethnicity-shootings-climate-change-school-violence-01673bd21da246ce942d1e98a08fc96f

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56. Social Media and Youth Mental Health | HHS.gov, https://www.hhs.gov/surgeongeneral/reports-and-publications/youth-mental-health/social-media/index.html