"Rebel or Die": The Radicalization of Anti-Mobilization Resistance in the Russian Federation

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine, initiated as a "Special Military Operation" in February 2022, fundamentally altered the social contract between the Kremlin and the Russian populace. For two decades, the Russian state maintained a paradigm of depoliticization, offering economic stability and domestic order in exchange for civil passivity. However, as the conflict transitioned into a protracted war of attrition characterized by staggering casualty rates, the state was forced to abandon this arrangement. The defining moment of this rupture was the September 2022 decree of "partial mobilization," which abruptly transformed the citizenry from passive spectators into active participants in a highly lethal conflict1. Faced with the prospect of being deployed as expendable infantry, a segment of the Russian population concluded that survival necessitated radical action. A stark, binary ethos began to crystallize within the Russian anti-war underground: "Rebel or Die"2. This phrase echoes historical revolutionary sentiments—such as Agnes Smedley’s observation regarding the Chinese communist revolution that "it is either rebel or die. And often it is rebel and die"—and accurately encapsulates the biopolitical reality of wartime Russia2. For a mobilized conscript, deployment to the Ukrainian front equates to a high probability of death or severe injury1. Consequently, resistance—whether through evasion, sabotage, or armed rebellion—became an urgent imperative for physical survival. This report provides an exhaustive analysis of the Russian anti-mobilization resistance, detailing the ideological confrontation with the state's "cult of death," the mechanics of civil evasion, the decentralized campaign of arson against military commissariats, organized infrastructure sabotage, and the broader systemic implications of a society forced into violent defiance.

The Ideological Battleground: The State's Cult of Death vs. The Imperative to Survive

To rationalize the extreme human cost of the war, the Russian state apparatus underwent a rapid ideological transformation, pivoting toward rhetoric that explicitly glorified death in service of the motherland5. The narrative frameworks promoted by the Kremlin and state media sought to condition the public to accept mass casualties as a noble, quasi-religious sacrifice.

The Glorification of Martyrdom

As the promise of a swift victory evaporated, state propagandists began to construct what analysts have termed a "cult of death." Leading media figures, most notably Vladimir Solovyov, utilized national television broadcasts to argue that life itself is "greatly overrated" and that citizens should embrace death, echoing assertions by President Vladimir Putin that fallen soldiers would "go to heaven"5. Solovyov implored audiences to "live for something you can die for," transitioning the state's ideology from building a prosperous future to seeking meaning exclusively through martyrdom5. This messaging was reinforced by Putin himself, who quoted the 19th-century poet Mikhail Lermontov regarding Russia's historical resistance to the French invasion, declaring, "We will die defending Moscow, like our brothers died\!"6. This rhetorical strategy demands a willingness from the population to sacrifice themselves without hesitation. Observers note that loyalty and patriotism in the Russian Federation have been increasingly reduced to a fatalistic obedience to superiors, resembling the ancient gladiatorial maxim: "Ave, Caesar\! Those who are about to die greet you\!"5. Religious figures aligned with the state amplified this messaging, assuring their congregations that Russians could truly "become themselves" only through participation in the conflict, framing the war as an existential defense of divine creation5.

The Reality of the Frontline and the Epidemic of Despair

Contrasting sharply with the sanitized and glorified vision of combat presented by state media is the grim reality experienced by mobilized personnel. Independent analyses reveal a military apparatus reliant on human-wave tactics, where inadequately trained conscripts are thrust into highly lethal environments7. Russian commanders have continually utilized "meat assaults," suffering disproportionate losses against Ukrainian defense forces that have increasingly leveraged robotization, drones, and precision artillery to minimize their own manpower requirements7. By late 2022, human rights organizations and independent media reported tens of thousands of deaths among mobilized recruits1. The BBC and other investigative outlets documented the decimation of elite units, including paratroopers, marines, and GRU special forces, of whom one in four were officers1. Reports of systematic internal abuse, extortion, and commanders demanding bribes to spare soldiers from "sure-death" assaults further eroded morale9. The psychological toll and the hopelessness of battlefield conditions have led to a documented epidemic of frontline suicides among Russian personnel. Drone surveillance from the Ukrainian Armed Forces has recorded dozens of instances where Russian soldiers, faced with severe wounds, lack of medical evacuation, or the imminent threat of capture or secondary drone strikes, chose to take their own lives. This phenomenon represents the ultimate, tragic realization of the "Die" outcome in the "Rebel or Die" dichotomy.

The stark divergence between the state's mythologized cult of death and the brutal reality of industrial slaughter documented in these frontline events catalyzed the resistance phenomenon. For the prospective conscript, the state no longer offered protection or glory; it offered a slow, mechanized execution.

The Catalyst: Mobilization and the Erasure of the Social Contract

The transition from a professional and contract-based military operation to one reliant on mass civilian mobilization marked the definitive rupture in Russian state-society relations. Prior to September 2022, the Kremlin had repeatedly denied intentions to mobilize the general populace, with Putin publicly guaranteeing that no reservists would be called to fight on at least 15 separate occasions1.

The September 2022 Decree and Coercive Enforcement

The announcement of "partial mobilization" on September 21, 2022, followed severe Russian territorial losses during the Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson1. Driven by pressure from ultra-nationalist factions and pro-war activists like Igor Girkin, the Kremlin aimed to draft 300,000 reservists1. The immediate societal reaction was profound shock. Initial protests erupted across 38 cities, resulting in the detention of over 1,233 individuals on the first day alone1. The state's response to these protests actively discouraged peaceful dissent: authorities began systematically handing draft summonses to detained male protesters directly at police stations1. The Moscow prosecutor's office warned that organizing or participating in anti-war protests could lead to up to 15 years in prison1. This punitive use of conscription delivered a chilling message—public opposition to the war would result in immediate deployment to the very conflict being protested. With traditional avenues of civil disobedience foreclosed, citizens were pushed toward more subversive methods of resistance.

Covert Mobilization and the Targeting of Vulnerable Populations

Following the highly unpopular public mobilization of 2022, the Kremlin officially denied plans for subsequent waves, opting instead for a strategy of "covert mobilization" and coercive contract recruitment1. To avoid the political fallout of a nationwide draft, the state implemented systemic, aggressive recruitment drives targeting the most vulnerable demographics: ethnic minorities, residents of economically depressed regions, and populations in temporarily occupied territories (TOT) of Ukraine1. In regions like Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, Russian occupation authorities coerced local men into obtaining Russian passports through fraudulent military commissariats, subsequently drafting them into the Russian army to fight against their own country7. Ukrainian residents drafted in these areas were routinely sent to training centers in Crimea or Novorossiysk before being deployed to the front lines as expendable shock troops7. Within Russia's borders, the mobilization disproportionately impacted rural and minority populations. By mid-2026, anti-war NGOs reported a significant rise in forced enlistments across regions such as Krasnodar, Omsk, Arkhangelsk, Udmurtia, and Buryatia12. Police and recruitment officers conducted street round-ups, detaining men at supermarkets, class reunions, and workplaces, often targeting intoxicated individuals who were subsequently coerced into signing military contracts under duress12. To sustain this steady flow of manpower without officially declaring a draft, the State Duma passed legislation raising the maximum conscription age from 27 to 30, with a transitional period extending to 2026, while simultaneously prohibiting all categories of conscripts from leaving the country11. This legislative entrapment forced millions of draft-eligible men into a corner, laying the sociological groundwork for radical evasion and sabotage.

The Semiotics of Resistance: From Peaceful Protest to Subversion

Before the anti-mobilization movement fully radicalized into armed insurgency and sabotage, it manifested through a complex semiotics of peaceful resistance. Protesters and dissident networks developed specific symbols and slogans to identify themselves and express opposition to the regime in an environment of total censorship.

Symbols of the Anti-War Movement

The earliest and most pervasive slogan of the resistance was "No to war\!" (Russian: "Нет войне\!", Net voyne\!), which appeared on handmade signs, graffiti, and social media13. As state crackdowns intensified, resulting in the arrest of children for leaving handmade signs outside the Ukrainian embassy in Moscow, the symbolism became more coded13.

• The White-Blue-White Flag: Created by removing the red stripe from the official Russian flag, this became the primary banner of the anti-war opposition. Protesters argued that the red represented blood and violence, and the modified flag sought to evoke the legacy of the historic Novgorod Republic as a symbol of democratic governance13.
• Green Ribbons: Activists utilized green ribbons tied to public infrastructure (fences, lampposts) as a subtle, decentralized symbol of opposition to the war13.
• Anthem of Free Russia: A musical composition originally proposed after the February 1917 Revolution (which temporarily overthrew the monarchy) saw a massive resurgence in popularity among dissidents, representing a historical continuity of resistance against autocracy13.

Grassroots Demonstrations and Demographics of Defiance

The demographics of the early resistance were heavily weighted toward women, primarily the mothers, wives, and sisters of men slated for the meat grinder. The Vesna movement organized nationwide rallies under the slogan "No mogilization" (a portmanteau of mobilization and mogila, the Russian word for grave), leading to mass detentions of protesters and ordinary passers-by1. In the Republic of Dagestan, a region heavily targeted by recruiters, severe unrest erupted. Villagers in Babayurt and Endirey physically blocked federal highways and clashed with government employees and police, resulting in security forces firing live ammunition into the air to disperse the crowds1. In Yakutsk, women organized rallies chanting "We will not give up our husbands" and "No to genocide," forming a traditional osuokhay round dance—symbolizing a mother's blessing for the safe return of her men—before being violently dispersed by security forces1. The systemic resistance of women eventually formalized into organizations such as Put' Domoi (The Way Home), which campaigned for the return of mobilized men from Ukraine. Demonstrating its zero-tolerance policy for dissent, the Russian Justice Ministry designated the wives' and mothers' organization as a "foreign agent" in May 2024, effectively criminalizing their advocacy1.

The Underground Railroad: Civil Evasion and "Idite Lesom"

Faced with the "Rebel or Die" binary and the suppression of peaceful protests, the initial response of hundreds of thousands of Russian men was flight. An estimated one million individuals fled the country in the immediate aftermath of the mobilization decree11. However, as borders tightened, electronic draft summonses were implemented, and financial resources dwindled, fleeing became increasingly difficult, necessitating organized, clandestine assistance. The most prominent manifestation of this non-violent, structural resistance is the civil society initiative "Idite Lesom" (idiomatically translated as "Get Lost"). Founded in the autumn of 2022 by civic activist Grigori Sverdlin, the organization operates as a modern underground railroad, providing logistical, legal, and financial assistance to Russians seeking to avoid conscription or desert the armed forces14. Operating with the explicit mission to "make sure that as few people as possible pull the trigger," Idite Lesom reframes draft evasion not merely as self-preservation, but as active civil resistance against the military-industrial complex14. By late 2026, the organization had successfully assisted over 80,771 individuals in evading the draft or deserting15. The network utilizes encrypted communications to guide deserters across borders into neighboring states such as Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan16. This operation navigates a perilous landscape where Russian security services actively attempt to abduct deserters abroad and return them to the Russian Federation for trial16. The systemic impact of organizations like Idite Lesom is profound. By facilitating the exodus of tens of thousands of potential combatants, this network exerts a strategic constraint on Russian force generation, functioning as a passive insurgency that continuously bleeds the state of its human capital.

The Radicalization of Dissent: Attacks on Military Commissariats

When flight proved impossible for many, resistance within Russia took a physical and violent turn. The primary symbols of the state's mobilization apparatus—the military commissariats (voenkomaty)—became the focal points of kinetic attacks. These enlistment offices, responsible for recruiting servicemen and maintaining paper conscription records, represent the precise administrative mechanism by which the state sentences its citizens to the front lines17.

The Arson Campaign

Beginning immediately after the invasion in February 2022 and accelerating exponentially following the September mobilization decree, a widespread, decentralized campaign of arson targeted military commissariats and local administration buildings across the Russian Federation17. The attacks were rarely coordinated by a central command; rather, they were carried out by a diverse array of actors, including left-wing anarchists, far-right nationalists, anti-war activists, and desperate lone wolves acting out of personal grievances4. The typical modus operandi involved the use of Molotov cocktails thrown through the windows of archives or administrative offices in an attempt to destroy conscription records17. An analysis of documented incidents reveals the geographic ubiquity and relentless tempo of this resistance:

These attacks represent a direct, physical manifestation of the "Rebel or Die" doctrine. By attempting to burn the physical infrastructure of the draft, individuals sought to preemptively disable the bureaucratic machinery capable of sending them or their relatives to their deaths.

Escalation to Armed Violence: Ust-Ilimsk and Soloti

While arson was the most common tactic, the desperation of forced mobilization inevitably precipitated incidents of lethal armed violence. The psychological breaking point of the populace was vividly illustrated by two highly significant shootings in late 2022, which struck at the heart of the military's logistical and training infrastructure. The Ust-Ilimsk Shooting: On September 26, 2022, days after the mobilization decree, 25-year-old Ruslan Zinin entered the military commissariat in Ust-Ilimsk, Irkutsk Oblast19. Zinin, whose 19-year-old friend had already been killed in Ukraine and whose cousin had just received a draft summons, sought out the head military commissar, Alexander Eliseev19. According to eyewitnesses, Zinin returned to an assembly hall filled with mobilized conscripts, declared "Now we'll all go home\!", and shot Eliseev at point-blank range with a sawed-off shotgun, critically wounding him with six shots to the chest1. Zinin's actions—sacrificing his own freedom to physically halt the deployment of his family and peers—epitomize the absolute breaking point of the social contract. The Soloti Military Training Ground Mass Shooting: The internal contradictions and ethnic frictions exacerbated by the state's covert mobilization strategy culminated in a catastrophic mass shooting on October 15, 2022, at a military training range near Soloti in the Belgorod Oblast1. Two volunteer soldiers, identified as Muslim Tajik nationals from a CIS country who had recently immigrated to Moscow, opened fire on their fellow personnel during a firearms training session, killing 11 and wounding 15 before being killed by return fire20. Investigations revealed that the shooting was preceded by a fierce religious and ideological dispute. The Tajik nationals argued that the war in Ukraine was not a "holy" war, asserting that a just war could only be fought by Muslims against infidels20. The confrontation escalated when a Russian lieutenant colonel allegedly insulted their religion, describing Allah as a "weakling" and a "coward"20. This incident highlights a profound second-order vulnerability in the Russian military: by aggressively recruiting marginalized migrants and ethnic minorities to fill the ranks, the state imported deep-seated ethnic and religious resentments directly into the armed forces, creating a highly volatile internal environment prone to fratricidal violence.

The Rail War: Partisan Networks and Infrastructure Sabotage

Beyond individual acts of desperation, the anti-war movement evolved to encompass highly organized, ideologically driven partisan networks dedicated to infrastructural sabotage. The vast expanse of the Russian Federation relies heavily on its railway network for the logistical sustenance of its armed forces. Recognizing this vulnerability, underground groups initiated a "Rail War" designed to physically impede the transportation of troops, armor, and munitions to the Ukrainian theater4.

The Combat Organization of Anarcho-Communists (BOAK)

The most prominent entity in the railway sabotage campaign is the Combat Organization of Anarcho-Communists (BOAK). Driven by an anti-authoritarian, anti-imperialist ideology, BOAK views the war in Ukraine as a tragedy but also as an opportunity to precipitate the collapse of the Putin regime by exploiting the overextension of the state23. Operating across an estimated 30% of Russian territory—stretching from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok—BOAK is composed of decentralized, autonomous cells4. The organization systematically targets railway infrastructure, primarily by dismantling rails, destroying signaling relay cabinets, and setting fire to railway transformers4. By short-circuiting signaling equipment, partisans force the railway networks into fail-safe modes, bringing military logistics trains to a grinding halt. Throughout 2022, BOAK and affiliated groups like "Stop the Wagons" (a name derived from the anti-war slogan "Stop the War") were linked to at least forty major sabotage incidents4. Notable disruptions included the stoppage of traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railway on June 29, 2022, a train derailment in Tver on July 5, and the derailment of freight trains in Krasnoyarsk Krai and Makhachkala4. A BOAK spokesperson clearly articulated the movement's logic: “Every derailed train means fewer grenades and fewer rockets thrown at peaceful Ukrainian cities”23. In addition to railway sabotage, BOAK has also claimed responsibility for arson attacks against cell towers to disrupt state communications, such as in the village of Belomestnoye, Belgorod Oblast4. The success of BOAK and other anarchist groups highlights a historical parallel: much like the Russian Czars who attempted to maintain a sprawling police state without adequate funding, resulting in systemic blind spots that allowed underground communication to flourish, the modern Russian security apparatus (FSB, Rosgvardiya) is fundamentally overstretched25. The sheer scale of the Russian railway network renders it indefensible against a decentralized, indigenous partisan threat.

Black Bridge and other Radical Factions

Alongside BOAK, other partisan factions have emerged, each possessing distinct operational focuses. "Black Bridge" (Chyornyy most) is a partisan movement explicitly opposed to Putin's rule and supportive of Ukraine's territorial integrity26. Formed in August 2022, the group initially sought to disrupt the illegal annexation referendums in occupied Ukraine26. Upon the announcement of mobilization, Black Bridge issued a manifesto declaring that "the regime has chosen a quick death through agony," welcoming the acceleration of the regime's fall while lamenting that "the partisan movement did not have time to properly take shape and the regime would still have time to send several tens of thousands of mobilized for fertilizer"26. Black Bridge embraces high-risk sabotage, most notably claiming responsibility for a devastating fire at a Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service building in Rostov-on-Don on March 16, 2023, striking directly at the heart of the state's security apparatus26.

The Vanguard of Terror: Targeted Assassinations and the NRA

While railway sabotage disrupts the physical logistics of the war, a distinct subset of the partisan underground has adopted targeted assassination to disrupt the ideological logistics of the state. These operations aim to instill terror among the elite propagandists and military officials who actively support and facilitate the war effort, bringing the violence of the front lines into the deep rear. The most prominent claims for these assassinations have originated from the "National Republican Army" (NRA), a shadowy underground organization whose existence and activities have been principally communicated through Ilya Ponomarev, a former Russian State Duma deputy based in Kyiv4.

Striking the Propagandists and Architects of War

On August 20, 2022, Darya Dugina, a prominent pro-war propagandist and daughter of extreme-right ideologue Aleksandr Dugin, was killed by a car bomb outside Moscow4. While the Russian government immediately classified the bombing as a terrorist act and blamed Ukrainian intelligence, Ponomarev asserted that the NRA was responsible, describing the assassination as a "momentous event" in the campaign to "overthrow the Putin regime"4. The NRA's manifesto claimed they target those who incite war and deny atrocities like the Bucha massacre, framing their actions as legitimate resistance against architects of state violence4. This tactic of striking high-profile enablers of the war continued. In April 2023, Vladlen Tatarsky, a highly influential pro-war military blogger and former combatant, was assassinated in a St. Petersburg cafe via an explosive device concealed inside a statuette presented to him4. Darya Trepova, a Russian citizen connected to the anti-war movement, was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 27 years in prison for delivering the explosive4. The violence also targeted the specific administrators of the draft. In July 2023, Navy Captain Stanislav Rzhitsky, deputy head of military mobilization in Krasnodar and a former submarine commander accused of launching cruise missiles at Ukrainian civilian targets, was shot dead while jogging4. The strategic intent behind these assassinations is clear: to systematically dismantle the state's monopoly on violence and impose severe personal costs on those who actively propagate the "cult of death" from the safety of the interior.

Internationalizing the Resistance: Foreign Legions and Border Incursions

The "Rebel or Die" ethos extended beyond domestic sabotage, leading thousands of Russians and other nationals to actively take up arms against the Russian state on the battlefield. In stark contrast to Russia's coercive mobilization, Ukraine passed the "Law on National Resistance," aimed at the systematic, voluntary defense preparation of its citizenry, transitioning away from Soviet-era conscription models toward modern, ideologically motivated territorial defense27. This infrastructure allowed for the integration of foreign volunteers. On February 27, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy authorized the creation of the International Legion of Territorial Defence of Ukraine28. The legion internationalized the conflict, drawing volunteers from over 90 nations28. Crucially, this included Russian citizens who chose to defect and fight their own government. Groups such as the Freedom of Russia Legion (FRL), the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC), the Sibir Battalion, and various North Caucasus and Chechen militant groups (e.g., OBON) operate alongside Ukrainian forces4. These groups have conducted daring armed ground incursions into Russian border regions, including Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk4. These incursions serve a dual strategic purpose: they force the Russian military to divert critical resources away from the Ukrainian front to defend the homeland, and they shatter the illusion of domestic invulnerability perpetuated by state media.

The Macro-Reflection of "Rebel or Die": The Wagner Mutiny

The biopolitical absolute of "Rebel or Die" is not confined to conscripted civilians and anarchist partisans; it eventually manifested at the highest echelons of the Russian military-industrial complex. The brief but spectacular mutiny of the Wagner Group in June 2023 serves as the ultimate systemic reflection of this dynamic. Led by billionaire mercenary financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group comprised tens of thousands of highly experienced combatants, including a vast number of recruited convicts used in penal battalions3. Following grueling battles in Bakhmut where Wagner forces suffered immense casualties in "human wave" attacks, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), led by Sergei Shoigu, initiated efforts to effectively disband Wagner by forcing all mercenaries to sign direct contracts with the regular army3. Simultaneously, Prigozhin alleged that the MoD had launched rocket attacks against Wagner camps in the rear, killing scores of his men3. Faced with the total dismantling of his power base, imprisonment, or the literal destruction of his forces by his own government, Prigozhin faced the exact same stark choice as the mobilized conscript: rebel, or die3. On June 23, 2023, Prigozhin launched a "march for justice," seizing the Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don and advancing armored columns toward Moscow3. During the advance, Wagner forces displayed significant military capabilities, shooting down multiple Russian attack helicopters (including KA-52s) and an airborne command post aircraft3. Notably, regular Russian military units offered little resistance. Civilians in Rostov were filmed providing food and water to the mercenaries, highlighting a profound apathy—if not tacit support—for an armed uprising against the MoD3. Although Prigozhin ultimately aborted the march after a brokered deal with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko (a decision that would shortly cost Prigozhin his life in a highly suspicious plane crash), the mutiny exposed the extreme fragility of the Russian state30. It demonstrated to the broader public and the partisan underground that the state's security apparatus is hollow, and that armed rebellion within the borders of the Russian Federation is logistically feasible30. The Wagner rebellion proved that when the state pushes any armed group—be it mobilized civilians or seasoned mercenaries—into a corner where survival is threatened, the inevitable outcome is violent internal rupture.

Conclusion

The Russian state's decision to launch a total war of attrition, sustained through the mass mobilization of its civilian populace, has irreversibly altered its domestic political landscape. By substituting a social contract based on economic stability with a radical ideology demanding unquestioning martyrdom and a "cult of death," the Kremlin has alienated a critical mass of its citizenry5. The slogan "Rebel or die" is not a hyperbolic political abstraction; it is the fundamental, calculating reality for millions of draft-eligible Russian men facing the grim statistics of frontline attrition2. This reality has birthed a multifaceted, highly adaptable ecosystem of resistance. On one end of the spectrum, civil society initiatives like Idite Lesom facilitate the mass evasion of conscription, operating as a passive insurgency that continuously bleeds the state's demographic and military potential12. On the other end, radicalized individuals and organized partisan networks—ranging from lone wolves throwing Molotov cocktails at military commissariats and anarchist cells sabotaging the Trans-Siberian railway, to underground groups assassinating state propagandists—have chosen to meet state violence with asymmetrical counter-violence4. The persistent, decentralized nature of these attacks, operating across vast swathes of Russian territory, indicates that the internal security apparatus is fundamentally overextended, mirroring the historical vulnerabilities of the Tsarist police state4. Furthermore, incidents like the Soloti training ground shooting and the Wagner mutiny reveal deep structural rot, ethnic fracturing, and institutional fragility within the hastily assembled ranks of the military itself3. Ultimately, the escalation of the anti-mobilization movement demonstrates that the application of total state coercion yields a corresponding radicalization in civil resistance. As long as the Russian state continues to view its populace as an expendable resource for a protracted and lethal conflict, the biopolitical imperative to survive will ensure that the domestic partisan war—the choice to rebel rather than die—will persist, continually eroding the operational capacity, logistical networks, and internal stability of the Russian Federation.

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