Democratic Cognitive Defense Without Domestic Manipulation

Full report

On this page

The proliferation of synthetic media, coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB), and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) presents a profound structural vulnerability for open societies. Democratic states face an inherent paradox: they must actively defend the integrity of their information environments against hostile state and non-state actors without simultaneously compromising the foundational rights of free expression, lawful domestic dissent, and political opposition. When state institutions default to arbitrating objective truth or policing domestic beliefs, they invariably encroach upon civil liberties, politicize the national security apparatus, and fatally degrade public trust. The evidentiary record of the past decade indicates that the most resilient and democratically legitimate frameworks explicitly divorce content analysis from behavioral analysis. By targeting the mechanisms of artificial amplification, hostile foreign origin, and technical tampering—rather than the ideological substance or political orientation of the speech itself—democracies can neutralize hostile cognitive operations. This report comprehensively examines the architecture of democratic cognitive defense, evaluating real institutional approaches to authentication, transparency, whistleblower protection, oversight, and journalistic independence. Through the analysis of ten national and institutional case studies, this document establishes a blueprint for behavior-based defense applicable at both the national intelligence level and within local jurisdictions, such as Cicero, Illinois.

The Paradigm Shift: Behavior-Based Defense vs. Belief Policing

The transition from content-based censorship to behavior-based defense represents the most critical evolution in democratic resilience strategy. Early institutional approaches to disinformation often relied on state agencies determining the factual accuracy of online content. This model routinely led to severe political blowback and the suppression of lawful, albeit controversial or dissenting, domestic speech. The contemporary behavioral standard shifts the operational focus toward detecting massive, deliberate, artificial, or automated dissemination techniques directed by concealed actors, predominantly of foreign origin. This decoupling of behavior from belief prevents defense agencies from acting as ministries of truth. Second-order insights reveal that when state agencies are restricted to analyzing metadata, network topography, and cryptographic provenance, they become highly effective at dismantling bot networks, troll farms, and foreign proxy campaigns without ever needing to parse the legal or cultural nuances of domestic political rhetoric. Conversely, third-order effects demonstrate that when a government agency is granted the authority to categorize domestic opinions as "malinformation"—a controversial classification defining true information that is allegedly framed to cause harm or panic—the agency inevitably becomes weaponized by partisan interests1. Malinformation protocols invariably lead to the pathologization of lawful dissent, resulting in catastrophic losses of institutional credibility, legislative investigations, and protracted judicial interventions that paralyze the state's legitimate defensive capabilities1.

Ecosystem Transparency, Oversight, and Legal Boundaries

To operate a behavioral defense system without engaging in domestic manipulation, a democracy must rely on interlocking mechanisms of transparency, stringent legal boundaries, and independent oversight. Platform Threat Reporting and Whistleblower Protection: The integrity of the digital information environment is overwhelmingly dictated by private technology monopolies. Consequently, democratic defense requires robust platform threat reporting mechanisms, such as those mandated by the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA)4. However, institutional reliance on self-reporting by platforms is insufficient and often yields sanitized data. Strong whistleblower protection laws are a prerequisite for cognitive defense, ensuring that platform employees can legally expose corporate negligence, the algorithmic amplification of FIMI, or the stripping of cryptographic metadata without fear of retaliation4. Whistleblowers serve as the ultimate democratic fail-safe when platform threat reporting becomes a public relations exercise rather than a substantive security function. Foreign-Influence Transparency and Researcher Access: State intelligence agencies cannot and should not hold a monopoly on threat detection. Independent researcher access to platform data is essential for a healthy information ecosystem. When governments utilize legislative mandates to pry open platform data silos for academic and civic researchers, they foster an ecosystem of independent, decentralized verification5. Furthermore, foreign-influence transparency laws must compel platforms to disclose the beneficial ownership and origin of paid political communications, stripping malicious actors of the anonymity required to execute coordinated inauthentic behavior5. Intelligence and Law-Enforcement Boundaries: A strict legal firewall must exist between agencies that hunt foreign adversaries and agencies that police domestic citizens. Intelligence services, possessing vast surveillance capabilities, must be legally constrained from utilizing their collection apparatus to monitor lawful domestic political discourse. When foreign intelligence indicates a cognitive attack, it must be sanitized, declassified to the lowest possible level, and handed over to independent electoral commissions or local jurisdictions to manage the public correction6. Parliamentary, Judicial, and Inspector-General Oversight: Executive branch agencies tasked with cognitive defense require aggressive oversight to prevent mission creep. Parliamentary committees, independent inspector generals (such as Canada's NSIRA), and an independent judiciary provide the necessary friction to ensure that defense programs do not suppress lawful speech or make unsupported attribution claims for political convenience3.

Institutional Case Studies in Cognitive Defense

The following case studies illustrate the spectrum of institutional architectures deployed to counter information threats. Each case is evaluated on its legal authority, safeguards, transparency, and its success or failure in avoiding domestic manipulation.

1. France: VIGINUM and the Executive Behavioral Model

Established in 2021 in response to the 2017 "Macron Leaks" hack-and-leak operation, France’s VIGINUM represents a highly regulated, executive-level response to FIMI6. Housed within the Secretariat-General for National Defense and Security (SGDSN), VIGINUM was explicitly designed to avoid the political blowback associated with domestic censorship. Its mandate is strictly limited to detecting inauthentic automated campaigns orchestrated by foreign actors that threaten France's fundamental interests, such as territorial integrity and republican institutions11.

The French model demonstrates that separating the identification of an attack from the political response is vital for democratic legitimacy. VIGINUM detects the threat but refers it to separate government or electoral bodies to determine the reaction, effectively insulating the analytical unit from allegations of political bias6. VIGINUM operates solely on open-source data and is legally prohibited from interacting with users, infiltrating private groups, or creating avatars11. By focusing on massive artificial dissemination rather than the ideological content of individual posts, the agency adheres strictly to a behavioral standard.

2. Sweden: Psychological Defence Agency (MPF) and Societal Resilience

Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency (MPF), launched in January 2022, revives the nation's Cold War-era concept of "total defense" adapted for the digital information landscape17. The MPF operates a whole-of-society framework, aiming to build psychological resilience against foreign malign information influence through media literacy, source criticism education, and institutional preparedness19.

While structurally ambitious, the MPF faces profound challenges in cleanly separating foreign instigation from domestic amplification. The 2021 social services disinformation campaign provides a critical lesson: foreign actors, including transnational Islamist influencers, amplified false domestic claims that the Swedish state was kidnapping Muslim children30. When a foreign adversary weaponizes a genuine domestic grievance, defensive agencies risk alienating minority communities. If public corrections are perceived as state propaganda dismissing legitimate community anxieties, the defense apparatus inadvertently deepens the societal polarization the adversary sought to exploit.

3. United Kingdom: NSOIT and the Risks of Mission Creep

The United Kingdom’s Counter Disinformation Unit (CDU), recently rebranded as the National Security Online Information Team (NSOIT), highlights the severe risks of domestic manipulation when jurisdictional boundaries are poorly defined and opaque. Originally established in 2019 to combat foreign interference in European elections, the unit's mandate expanded dramatically during the COVID-19 pandemic to monitor domestic social media platforms for public health misinformation and general political dissent8.

The UK model demonstrates that without explicit statutory prohibitions against monitoring domestic speech, counter-disinformation units will inevitably pathologize lawful dissent. The NSOIT utilized external AI firms, such as Logically, to ingest massive volumes of domestic communications. These contractors logged legitimate posts by respected figures questioning lockdown policies, justifying the surveillance by stating that while the content was not technically disinformation, it had the "potential for a narrative to be weaponised"31. Permitting the state to flag domestic speech as "problematic" contextually—even when the content is verifiably true—fundamentally erodes the democratic information environment and crosses the line into belief policing.

4. United States: CISA’s MDM Task Force and Constitutional Conflicts

In the United States, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) evolved its Countering Foreign Influence Task Force into the Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation (MDM) team2. This semantic and operational shift proved disastrous for the agency's credibility. By expanding its purview to include "malinformation"—defined as genuine, truthful information shared with the intent to cause harm, often by moving private information into the public sphere—CISA effectively arrogated the power to evaluate the political motives behind domestic speech1.

The CISA case study solidifies a critical structural insight: in constitutional republics with strong free speech protections, state security agencies cannot act as arbiters of truth or intent. When defense institutions coordinate with private technology monopolies to suppress domestic narratives under the guise of combating "malinformation," they trigger a profound systemic immune response. The resulting litigation and loss of public trust ultimately paralyze the state's ability to combat legitimate, behaviorally defined foreign threats.

5. Australia: Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce (EIAT)

Australia has managed to avoid the severe domestic overreaches of its Five Eyes partners by strictly scoping its defense apparatus. The Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce (EIAT) is activated specifically around federal electoral events and serves solely in an advisory capacity to the fiercely independent Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)36.

The Australian model succeeds primarily because its definition of actionable disinformation is rigorously conjunctive: the content must be verifiably false, deceptive, and propagated via inauthentic behaviors40. This dual requirement establishes a high threshold that protects organic, albeit highly polarized, domestic political discourse. Furthermore, embedding the task force within a statutory authority (the AEC) rather than a purely executive national security body prevents the incumbent government from weaponizing electoral security against political opponents37.

6. Canada: CEIPP and the Friction of Intelligence Sharing

Canada’s approach to democratic defense highlights the profound friction between classified intelligence gathering and the public necessity of exposing foreign interference. The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP), managed by a Panel of Five senior civil servants, was designed to warn the public of systemic election interference44. However, subsequent reviews by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) and the Hogue Commission exposed catastrophic failures in intelligence sharing9.

The Canadian experience yields a vital second-order insight: a cognitive defense system is practically useless if its threat assessments never leave the intelligence community. The failure to warn sitting MP Michael Chong that his family in Hong Kong was being targeted by PRC intelligence, alongside the failure to address severe localized disinformation on WeChat, demonstrates the acute danger of over-classification9. Democratic defense requires established, legalized pathways for intelligence to be downgraded and shared with platform operators, targeted diaspora communities, and independent oversight bodies. NSIRA's critique proves that intelligence meant to protect democracy cannot be hoarded by the executive branch; it must be operationalized to protect the victims of transnational repression7.

7. Illinois, USA: Cyber Navigator Program (Local Jurisdiction Focus)

Addressing cognitive defense at the municipal and county level—such as in Cicero, Illinois, or broader Cook County—requires an understanding of severe resource constraints and the prioritization of hard infrastructure. The Illinois Cyber Navigator Program relies on federal Help America Vote Act funds to distribute cybersecurity resources equitably across the state's local election authorities49.

For local jurisdictions like Cicero, the Illinois model highlights a critical defense gap. While securing the physical and digital infrastructure of the vote is paramount, local municipalities lack the intelligence capabilities or jurisdictional authority to detect FIMI or dismantle coordinated inauthentic behavior. Local democratic defense must therefore rely on a synthesis of top-down federal threat-sharing (like CISA or the EI-ISAC) combined with robust, decentralized local civic verification networks and cryptographic provenance protocols.

8. Taiwan: Civic Verification Networks and MODA

Taiwan faces arguably the most intense and sustained information warfare environment globally, primarily originating from the PRC. Rather than relying solely on state censorship or executive task forces, the Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) champions a model of collaborative security characterized by radical transparency and civic integration52.

Taiwan proves that democratic cognitive defense is most legitimate and effective when it is crowdsourced. When the government treats civil society as a co-equal partner in defense—creating open APIs and supporting platforms like Cofacts—it neutralizes the threat of domestic manipulation by decentralizing the authority of verification. This model shifts the burden of proof from a centralized intelligence agency to a highly literate, networked citizenry.

9. Technical Provenance: C2PA and the Content Authenticity Initiative

To combat synthetic media without resorting to regulating speech or banning technologies, the fundamental technical architecture of the internet must evolve. The Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) provides a secure, opt-in standard for digital provenance54. By embedding cryptographically signed manifests into media files at the point of creation, C2PA allows users to view the history and alterations of an asset, including the use of generative AI54.

Authentication of official communications via C2PA solves a major vector of election interference: the spoofing of election authorities. If local jurisdictions, such as the clerk's office in Cicero, Illinois, cryptographically sign all official election guidance, the public can easily identify deepfaked press releases or AI-generated robocalls56. C2PA represents the ultimate behavioral defense: it relies purely on mathematics, Merkle trees, and cryptographic hashes, remaining entirely agnostic to political ideology55.

10. Independent Journalism: Journalism Trust Initiative (JTI)

While C2PA authenticates the digital file, the Journalism Trust Initiative (JTI), developed by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), authenticates the institutional integrity of the publisher63. JTI is a self-regulatory, ISO-type standard that assesses media outlets based on algorithmic independence, ownership transparency, and editorial ethics5.

JTI provides a market-based, systemic solution to cognitive defense. By establishing an objective, transparent framework for what constitutes a legitimate journalistic enterprise, democracies can encourage technology platforms to algorithmically prioritize high-quality information. Crucially, this mechanism operates without the government ever needing to define what is true or false, thereby completely avoiding the pitfalls of domestic manipulation and censorship65.

Synthesis: Public Correction, Accountability, and Local Application

When cognitive defense relies on behavioral standards—such as shutting down inauthentic bot networks, authenticating official communications with C2PA, and prioritizing JTI-certified journalism—the necessity for state-issued "public corrections" diminishes. However, when correction is absolutely necessary to preserve public safety or electoral integrity, it must be executed by independent, non-partisan bodies (like the AEC in Australia or civic networks in Taiwan), not by executive intelligence units6. Media and information literacy serves as the society's cognitive immune system. Sweden's emphasis on "source criticism"—teaching citizens to interrogate who is speaking, why they are speaking, and how confirmation bias alters perception—represents a long-term defense against manipulation20. A population trained to critically evaluate the provenance of information is significantly harder to manipulate, neutralizing the efficacy of synthetic media and FIMI at the point of consumption20. For local jurisdictions like Cicero, Illinois, integrating these principles requires a localized synthesis of the national models. Local election authorities cannot run counter-intelligence operations. Instead, they must rely on the Illinois Cyber Navigator Program to secure the physical vote tallies and databases49. Simultaneously, local officials must adopt C2PA standards for their own communications to provide citizens with a cryptographic baseline of truth56. By fostering local civic verification networks and supporting JTI-compliant local journalism, municipalities can create a hostile environment for disinformation without ever needing to police the lawful beliefs of their constituents.

Conclusion

The pursuit of democratic cognitive defense is inherently precarious. The natural reflex of the security state is to suppress threats by attempting to control the information space—an impulse that directly contradicts the democratic mandate of free expression. The evidence synthesized from global institutional approaches reveals a clear, actionable paradigm: democracies must abandon the policing of belief and commit entirely to the policing of behavior. When institutions like the UK's NSOIT or the US's MDM task force attempt to arbitrate the truthfulness of domestic narratives, they invariably suppress lawful speech, invite intense partisan backlash, and fracture the societal consensus required for national defense. Conversely, when institutions strictly bound their mandates—such as France's VIGINUM targeting foreign automated manipulation, Australia's EIAT advising an independent electoral commission, or the C2PA consortium providing cryptographic proof of technical provenance—they succeed in hardening the information environment. They neutralize synthetic media and coordinated inauthentic behavior without manipulating their own citizens. To safeguard localized jurisdictions and national elections alike, defense frameworks must integrate radical transparency, strict intelligence boundaries, expansive whistleblower protections, and the unyielding empowerment of independent civic and journalistic networks. True cognitive resilience is not achieved by a government sheltering its citizens from falsehoods, but by equipping a society with the cryptographic tools, media literacy, and transparent institutional architecture necessary to determine the truth for itself.

Works cited

1. (PDF) Mal-Information, the Anatomy of an “Information Disorder” \- ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390010413\_Mal-Information\_the\_Anatomy\_of\_an\_Information\_Disorder

2. Mal-Information, the Anatomy of an “Information Disorder” \- SJSU ScholarWorks, https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1090\&context=secrecyandsociety

3. 1 Testimony of Mr. Gary M. Lawkowski Senior Fellow, the Council to Modernize Governance “Censorship Laundering Part II \- Committee on Homeland Security, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2023-12-13-OIA-HRG-Testimony.pdf

4. EMPOWERING TRUST\! \- Luxgap, https://luxgap.com/assets/brochures/Luxgap-brochure-EN.pdf

5. Nurturing the Integrity of Political Communication in the Digital Era \- Agora, https://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/agora-documents/Nurturing%20the%20Integrity%20of%20Political%20Communication%20in%20the%20Digital%20Era\_An%20OGP%20Perspective.pdf

6. Election Disinformation \- Innovations for Successful Societies, https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/document/3406

7. Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions \- Final Report Vol. 4 (Janua, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/PIFI\_-\_Final\_Report\_Vol.\_4\_\_2025\_.pdf

8. Counter disinformation unit \- Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter\_disinformation\_unit

9. Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions \- Initial Report (May 2024), https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user\_upload/Foreign\_Interference\_Commission\_-\_Initial\_Report\_\_May\_2024\_\_-\_Digital.pdf

10. VIGINUM YEAR \#1 \- SGDSN, https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/Publications/RA-Viginum-Annee1-32p-V20\_EN\_LQP-1.pdf

11. Building Resilience Against Election Influence Operations: Preparing for the European Elections in 2024 and Beyond \- The International Foundation for Electoral Systems: IFES, https://www.ifes.org/pub/building-resilience-against-election-influence-operations-/case-studies

12. How to reconcile countering FIMI and protecting democratic values: the case of France, https://www.eu-values.eu/blog/how-to-reconcile-countering-fimi-and-protecting-democratic-values-the-case-of-france

13. Threats to UK democracy: Disinformation, foreign interference and declining public trust, https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/threats-to-uk-democracy-disinformation-foreign-interference-and-declining-public-trust/

14. French towns sizzle as May shapes up to be hottest on record | The Straits Times, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/french-towns-sizzle-as-may-shapes-up-to-be-hottest-on-record

15. FRENCH AUTHORITIES INVESTIGATED WHETHER AN ISRAELI FIRM WAS INVOLVED IN AN INTERFERENCE CAMPAIGN AGAINST POLITICIANS, AND UKRAINE LAUNCHED A LARGE-SCALE STRIKE AGAINST TARGETS IN MOSCOW \- The Counterterrorism Group, https://www.counterterrorismgroup.com/post/french-authorities-investigated-whether-an-israeli-firm-was-involved-in-an-interference-campaign-aga

16. Risky Bulletin: Microsoft disrupts StegoAd operation \- Risky Business Media, https://risky.biz/risky-bulletin-microsoft-disrupts-stegoad-operation/

17. Designing for Resilience: Building Institutions to Safeguard Information Ecosystems, https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/html/designing-resilience-building-institutions-safeguard-information

18. Geopolitical Therapy: Psychological Defence and Individual Responsibility, https://mau.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:2085291/FULLTEXT02.pdf

19. Strengthening transparency and integrity in public decision-making processes in Sweden \- OECD, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-integrity-review-of-sweden\_648d3988-en/full-report/strengthening-transparency-and-integrity-in-public-decision-making-processes-in-sweden\_3d6c833c.html

20. Source criticism | Psychological defence agency, https://mpf.se/psychological-defence-agency/knowledge-and-support/thematic-library/source-criticism

21. Psychological defence \- Krisinformation.se, https://www.krisinformation.se/en/hazards-and-risks/hojd-beredskap-och-krig/psychological-defence/

22. Sweden's New Psychological Defense Agency Offers Alternate Model, https://information-professionals.org/swedens-new-psychological-defense-agency-offers-alternate-model/

23. PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFENCE AND INFORMATION INFLUENCE \- Myndigheten för psykologiskt försvar, https://mpf.se/download/18.6888ebfe19b2bdfbd24538b/1768813534949/Psychological\_defence\_TGA.pdf

24. Psychological Defence: Concepts and principles for the 2020s \- Myndigheten för psykologiskt försvar, https://mpf.se/download/18.34845f44192b793f4ee27d9/1730120674895/241017\_Psychological-Defence-Concepts-and-principles-for-the-2020s\_rapport.pdf

25. Differing Anti-disinformation Approaches Between the United Kingdom and Sweden, https://essay.utwente.nl/101663/1/Krohn\_BA\_BMS.pdf

26. Psychological defence agency, https://mpf.se/psychological-defence-agency

27. Chinese government efforts to influence Swedish media \- Swedish National China Centre, https://kinacentrum.se/en/publications/chinese-government-efforts-to-influence-swedish-media/

28. A genealogy of Swedish psychological defence: Information influence as a shifting problem for democratic governance, https://www.psychologicaldefence.lu.se/sites/psychologicaldefence.lu.se/files/2025-05/orden-2025-a-genealogy-of-swedish-psychological-defence-information-influence-as-a-shifting-problem-for-democratic.pdf

29. Full article: “What is psychological in psychological defence? Revisiting the Nordic total defence doctrines” \- Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2026.2664463

30. DISINFORMATION LANDSCAPE IN SWEDEN \- EU DisinfoLab, https://www.disinfo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Sweden\_DisinfoFactsheet.pdf

31. UK minister defends government's rebranded Counter Disinformation Unit — FSU Archive, https://freespeechunion.org/archive/uk-minister-defends-governments-rebranded-counter-disinformation-unit

32. Written Evidence submitted by Logically (SMH0049) \- UK Parliament Committees, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/132990/html/

33. and empower the public voice so we can collectively reclaim our privacy, defend our civil liberties and protect freedoms for the future. \- UK Parliament Committees, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/132978/html/

34. United Kingdom: Freedom on the Net 2024 Country Report, https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-net/2024

35. We'd like to use additional cookies to understand how you use the site and improve our services. \- UK Parliament Committees, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/128453/html/

36. Australian Government Response to the Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media \- Department of Home Affairs, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/reports-and-pubs/PDFs/government-response-publication-senate-select-commitee-foreign-interference-through-social-media.pdf

37. AEC 2025–26 Corporate Plan \- Australian Electoral Commission, https://www.aec.gov.au/about\_aec/Publications/corporate-plan/index.htm

38. Safeguarding-elections-in-the-age-of-AI-and-synthetic-content-TIAL-white-paper-2025.pdf \- The Institutional Architecture Lab, https://tial.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Safeguarding-elections-in-the-age-of-AI-and-synthetic-content-TIAL-white-paper-2025.pdf

39. Appendix 3 \- 46th Parliament inquiry recommendations, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary\_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign\_Interference\_through\_Social\_Media/ForeignInterference47/Report/Appendix\_3\_-\_46th\_Parliament\_inquiry\_recommendations

40. Finding balance: combatting misinformation and disinformation without threatening free expression \- Australian Human Rights Commission, https://humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/ahrc\_submission\_on\_exposure\_draft\_bill\_18\_august\_2023\_0.pdf

41. G7 Rapid Response Mechanism Annual Report 2025 \- Global Affairs Canada, https://international.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/corporate/reports/rapid-response-mechanism/annual-report-2025

42. AEC Corporate Plan 2024-25 \- Australian Electoral Commission, https://www.aec.gov.au/About\_AEC/Publications/corporate-plan/files/2024/2024-corporate-plan.pdf

43. 6\. Third parties and foreign actors \- Parliament of Australia, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary\_Business/Committees/Senate/Finance\_and\_Public\_Administration/IntegrityofElections/Report/Section?id=committees%2Freportjnt%2F024439%2F73871

44. Intelligence watchdog calls out panel for failing to sound alarm on election interference, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/panel-of-five-election-interference-nsira-1.7217470

45. Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions \- Final Report Vol. 3 (Janua, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection\_2025/bcp-pco/CP32-169-2-2025-eng-3.pdf

46. Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions \- Final Report Vol. 2 (Janua, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/PIFI\_-\_Final\_Report\_Vol.\_2\_\_2025\_.pdf

47. Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions \- Final Report Vol. 1 (Janua, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/report\_volume\_1.pdf

48. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs appearance before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) on foreign election interference, https://international.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/corporate/transparency/briefing-documents/parliamentary-committee/2023-06-13-proc

49. Public Act 100-0587 \- Illinois General Assembly, https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/publicacts/100/PDF/100-0587.pdf

50. Public Act 0587 100TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY \- ILGA.gov, https://www.ilga.gov/ftp/Public%20Acts/100/100-0587.htm

51. The County of Cook, https://www.cookcountyil.gov/sites/g/files/ywwepo161/files/documents/2022-08/Sales%20Tax%20Series%202022A%20and%202022B%20Final%20POS.pdf

52. IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking 2025: Taiwan secures, https://www.tiplo.com.tw/en/tn/1441/48284

53. Isabel Hou, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA), Taiwan \- GovInsider, https://govinsider.asia/intl-en/article/isabel-hou-deputy-minister-ministry-of-digital-affairs-moda-taiwan

54. C2PA: Enterprise Content Authenticity Solutions \- SSL.com, https://www.ssl.com/article/c2pa-enterprise-content-authenticity-solutions/

55. C2PA and Content Credentials Explainer, https://spec.c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/2.4/explainer/Explainer.html

56. NC S738 \- BillTrack50, https://www.billtrack50.com/billdetail/1876387

57. Content Authenticity Initiative \- Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content\_Authenticity\_Initiative

58. How Adopting Content Provenance Standards Can Help Government Organizations in the Fight Against Mis- and Disinformation | by Mike Kujawski | Medium, https://medium.com/@mikekujawski/how-adopting-content-provenance-standards-can-help-government-organizations-in-the-fight-against-5095f6e2448e

59. Authenticating Election Coverage in Hong Kong \- Starling Lab, https://starlinglab.org/case-studies/authentication-election-coverage-hong-kong/

60. Verifying Provenance of Digital Media: Why the C2PA Specifications Fall Short \- arXiv, https://arxiv.org/html/2604.24890v1

61. C2PA and Election Integrity: Stopping Deepfakes at the Source| Limbo, https://trylimbo.com/blog-posts/c2pa-election-integrity-deepfakes

62. C2PA and Content Credentials Explainer, https://spec.c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/2.2/explainer/\_attachments/Explainer.pdf

63. About CBC News, https://www.cbc.ca/news/about-cbc-news-1.1294364

64. ASD Blueprint \- Alliance For Securing Democracy, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/NEW-ASD-European-Blueprint-2019-03-July.pdf

65. Findings Report: The Media Freedom Cohort | Internews, https://internews.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/FindingsReport\_MediaFreedomCohort\_27March23.pdf

66. WORKING GROUP ON INFODEMICS \- Forum on Information & Democracy, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ForumID\_Report-on-infodemics\_101120.pdf

67. Information Ecosystems and Troubled Democracy: The State of Knowledge on News Media, AI, and Data Governance \- DiVA Portal, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:2011448/FULLTEXT02.pdf

68. The value of testimony in the age of artificial intelligence \- Alternatives Humanitaires, https://www.alternatives-humanitaires.org/en/2025/07/30/the-value-of-testimony-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence/

69. The Fight Against Disinformation in the U.S.: A Landscape Analysis, https://shorensteincenter.org/resource/the-fight-against-disinformation-in-the-u-s-a-landscape-analysis/

70. Guidance Note on countering the spread of online mis- and disinformation through fact-checking and platform design solutions in a human rights compliant manner, https://rm.coe.int/cdmsi-2023-015-msi-inf-guidance-note/1680add25e