Independent Public-Web Research Assignment: 2IA.org Psychological Operations and Influence-Operations Content Audit

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Research Date: July 26, 2026 Current-Through Date: July 26, 2026 Operating Location: Cicero, Illinois Research Note: Doctrine-sensitive claims regarding the transition from Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 to JP 3-04, and the adoption of the Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) framework, require continuing verification as United States Department of Defense (DOD) terminology undergoes active bureaucratic revision.

1. Executive Summary

This comprehensive evidentiary, legal, historical, and educational audit evaluates the public-facing content of the civil-liberties publication 2IA (Two Identities Of Anonymous), specifically examining its treatment of psychological operations (PSYOP), influence operations, propaganda, and associated doctrines. Conducted exclusively via lawful public-web research and utilizing available 2IA.org indices, historical archives, and topic hubs, this report assesses the platform's doctrinal precision, historical case quality, measurement frameworks, global representation, and ethical boundaries. The primary finding of this exhaustive review is a fundamental structural divergence between official military doctrine and 2IA's editorial framework. SCHOLARLY INTERPRETATION indicates that 2IA.org does not function as a repository of military or state-level psychological warfare doctrine. Instead, the platform operates as a civilian, anti-surveillance-abuse resource optimized for media literacy, open-source intelligence (OSINT) verification, and public accountability1. The site explicitly reframes traditional warfare terminology into a "speech-preserving taxonomy," prioritizing the defense of civil liberties, anonymous speech, and privacy over the analysis of state-directed coercion2. Consequently, the audit reveals profound deficits in 2IA’s coverage of historical state-sponsored influence cases, military doctrinal evolution, and non-Western information environments. Conversely, the platform demonstrates exceptional rigor in its ethical boundaries, source-quality methodology, and absolute prohibition of coercive operational tradecraft. 2IA successfully isolates the mechanics of influence from sensationalized narratives of "mind control," anchoring its analysis in provenance, verifiable public records, and institutional oversight3.

2. Public-Content Inventory

An exhaustive public-content discovery protocol was executed across the 2IA.org domain to locate all meaningful pages related to psychological operations, doctrine, terminology, and related research archives. The organization centralizes its research into "Topic Hubs" that replace thin category archives with source-controlled public pages defining the issue, context, practical steps, and correction paths2. The following matrix inventories the discovered public architecture relevant to this audit.

VERIFIED FACT: The platform explicitly states it is an independent public-intelligence research project and not an operational intelligence service, hacking guide, or partisan campaign shop1. The site does not host live campaign plans, target-audience exploitation instructions, or psychographic targeting guidance, fulfilling its stated mandate to avoid operational abuse playbooks1.

3. Terminology Findings

Doctrinal precision requires the rigorous separation of terms denoting distinct legal authorities, operational methods, and strategic intents. The audit evaluated 2IA’s capacity to distinguish seventeen specific terms related to influence and psychological operations. The analysis reveals that 2IA routinely collapses precise military and diplomatic taxonomy into broad, civilian-oriented categories centered on media literacy and algorithmic amplification.

3.1. General Civilian and Literacy Terminology

• Propaganda: OFFICIAL DOCTRINE and academic consensus define propaganda as communication primarily used to influence an audience and persuade them to further an agenda10. 2IA correctly utilizes this term, categorizing it under its influence operations hub as narratives, symbols, repetition, and selective facts designed to shape perception11.
• Disinformation vs. Misinformation: SCHOLARLY INTERPRETATION distinguishes disinformation (intentionally false or misleading information spread to deceive) from misinformation (incorrect information spread without malicious intent)12. 2IA accurately captures disinformation as false claims designed to confuse or polarize, but its public hubs rarely explore the distinct, non-malicious mechanics of misinformation11.
• Ordinary Persuasion: While not explicitly indexed as a distinct topic, 2IA addresses persuasion implicitly by separating lawful public discourse and media literacy from "coercive influence"3.

3.2. Military and State-Directed Terminology

2IA demonstrates profound deficits in distinguishing specific military and intelligence terminologies.

• Psychological Warfare & PSYOP: OFFICIAL DOCTRINE defines psychological operations as military operations conveying selected information to foreign audiences to influence their motives, reasoning, and behavior14. 2IA previously utilized the /psychological-warfare/ route but states it is actively preserving the slug while reframing the subject entirely around media literacy, thereby abandoning the military context of the term3.
• Military Information Support Operations (MISO): In 2010, the U.S. DOD replaced the term PSYOP with MISO to avoid the negative connotations of propaganda and deceit, though the services later began reverting to the PSYOP label due to administrative confusion15. 2IA makes no mention of MISO, completely ignoring the bureaucratic distinction between peacetime shaping operations and combat influence.
• Information Operations (IO) & Operations in the Information Environment (OIE): Historically, IO was defined in JP 3-13 as the integrated employment of information-related capabilities (IRCs)16. By 2022, JP 3-04 superseded JP 3-13, replacing IO with OIE, defined as military actions involving multiple information forces to affect drivers of behavior16. UNKNOWN: 2IA does not track or utilize the terms IO, IRC, or OIE.
• Military Deception (MILDEC) & Covert Action: OFFICIAL DOCTRINE places MILDEC alongside PSYOP and OPSEC as distinct pillars of historical IO17. Covert action refers to operations where government sponsorship is unacknowledged17. 2IA fails to distinguish these, treating deception purely as a civilian platform-moderation issue rather than a state-authorized capability.
• Cognitive Warfare: Recognized as military activities designed to affect attitudes and behaviors, serving as an extension of information warfare18. 2IA does not utilize this term.

3.3. Diplomatic and Political Terminology

• Public Affairs & Public Diplomacy: OFFICIAL DOCTRINE dictates that public affairs communicates truthful intent and policies to domestic and international audiences, structurally separated from PSYOP to maintain credibility17. 2IA does not explore this institutional firewall.
• Strategic Communication: Often utilized at the interagency or executive level to synchronize messaging. 2IA does not index this term.
• Political Warfare & Active Measures: Political warfare involves hostile political means to compel an opponent19. "Active measures" specifically describes Soviet and Russian political warfare20. 2IA omits both terms.
• Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI): Defined by the European External Action Service (EEAS) as intentional, coordinated manipulative behavior by state or state-linked actors that threatens political processes21. 2IA relies instead on generic terms like "amplification" and "proxy networks"2, missing the precise state-actor attribution inherent in FIMI.
• Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior & Computational Propaganda: While 2IA discusses "bot or proxy networks" and "synthetic media," it does not formally adopt standard platform-security terminology (CIB) or academic terminology (computational propaganda)3.

INFERENCE: 2IA intentionally discards specialized military, diplomatic, and platform-security terminology. It incorrectly treats state-sponsored cognitive warfare, covert political warfare, and organic algorithmic amplification as indistinguishable facets of a broader "attention" and "media literacy" crisis. This represents a structural limitation for advanced doctrinal research.

4. Doctrine Findings

The evolution of influence doctrine—particularly within the United States military and NATO—reflects an ongoing struggle to adapt industrial-era psychological warfare concepts to the digital information environment. A comprehensive doctrine critic must map how these concepts transition across strategic, operational, and tactical echelons.

4.1. The Evolution of U.S. Military Doctrine

OFFICIAL DOCTRINE has historically segmented the information environment into physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions23.

• The PSYOP Era: Rooted in historical doctrine, psychological operations were explicitly designed to induce psychological effects in foreign audiences.
• The IO and MISO Era: The publication of JP 3-13 (1998, revised 2006, 2012, 2014\) attempted to consolidate computer network operations, PSYOP, electronic warfare, OPSEC, and MILDEC under Information Operations16. Concurrently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed the shift from PSYOP to MISO, asserting the new term more accurately reflected the activities, though critics argued MISO obfuscated the fundamental objective of influence16.
• The OIE Era: Recognizing that information is a joint function, the DOD issued JP 3-04 in 2022, moving beyond IO to Operations in the Information Environment (OIE). This doctrine focuses on generating, preserving, and applying informational power across the competition continuum (cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and warfighting)24.

4.2. 2IA’s Doctrinal Vacuum

VERIFIED FACT: 2IA.org completely bypasses the organizational, bureaucratic, and legal architecture of official doctrine.

• The site offers no analysis of the division of labor between geographic combatant commands, intelligence support for OIE (IOII), or tactical maneuver forces executing influence operations23.
• Instead of analyzing doctrine, 2IA analyzes infrastructure and procurement. The platform asserts that "Policy Gets Laundered Through Procurement," arguing that the true nature of surveillance and scoring systems is found not in doctrinal publications, but in statements of work, vendor claims, and data-use clauses9.

DISPUTE: While 2IA's focus on procurement accurately captures the privatization of domestic surveillance and algorithmic risk scoring, it entirely fails to capture the nature of state-directed psychological operations, which are rarely contracted through transparent public procurement mechanisms.

5. Historical Case Findings

An evaluation of 2IA's historical repository reveals that the organization does not curate or analyze traditional military psychological operations.

5.1. Missing Historical Cases

The audit conducted targeted searches for foundational psychological warfare and active measures cases. The following are definitively UNKNOWN/Absent from the 2IA public archive:

• Soldatensender Calais: A British black propaganda broadcaster during WWII26.
• Radio Free Europe and Hungary, 1956: No records found3.
• Malayan Emergency: No records found.
• Chieu Hoi Program: The U.S. and South Vietnamese defection initiative during the Vietnam War27.
• Operation Denver (AIDS disinformation): Soviet KGB active measure3.
• 1991 Gulf War PSYOP: No records found3.

5.2. The Digital-Era Case Study: "Anonymous"

The sole comprehensive case study related to influence, identity, and asymmetric communication available on 2IA focuses on the "Anonymous" hacktivist collective. 2IA utilizes this case not to teach operational disruption, but to examine identity compartmentalization, media amplification, and attribution complexity11.

SCHOLARLY INTERPRETATION: By relying on a decentralized, non-state entity (Anonymous) as its primary influence case study, 2IA avoids the complexities of state sponsorship, classified planning, and military effectiveness. This reinforces the site's orientation as a civil-liberties observer of internet culture rather than a historian of kinetic or state-level psychological warfare.

6. Reach-versus-Effect Findings

A critical failure in contemporary analysis of information operations is the conflation of distribution (the volume of content pushed into an environment) with persuasion (the successful alteration of an audience's beliefs or behaviors). A rigorous framework must separate output, distribution, availability, reach, exposure, attention, recall, comprehension, belief, attitude, intention, behavior, and strategic effect.

6.1. 2IA’s Measurement Paradigm: Attention and Provenance

2IA correctly identifies that manipulation thrives when analysis focuses solely on verification (whether a claim is true) rather than mechanics (how and why it spread)3.

• Attention over Effect: 2IA isolates attention as the primary strategic terrain. It posits that influence campaigns seek to dictate what populations "fear, blame, repeat, ignore, surrender, buy, join, or attack"3.
• Separating Reach from Belief: The platform asks, "Who benefits when a narrative spreads faster than its proof?"3. This acknowledges that high reach and exposure (e.g., viral circulation) do not inherently equate to belief.

6.2. Measurement Deficits

Despite recognizing the attention economy, 2IA lacks any formal measurement framework to assess the downstream cognitive chain.

• Absence of Behavioral Metrics: The site does not provide methodologies to measure recall, comprehension, attitude change, or intention.
• No Strategic Effect Analysis: 2IA does not evaluate whether exposure to disinformation actually changes voting behavior, induces defection, or alters geopolitical strategic outcomes.
• INFERENCE: Because 2IA operates from a defensive, media-literacy posture, its primary objective is to interrupt the cognitive chain at the exposure/attention phase through source verification and provenance tracking3. It assumes that equipping a reader with public records and structural friction (e.g., ad transparency, bot labels) is sufficient to neutralize the strategic effect of an operation11. It does not attempt to measure the success of the adversary.

7. Source-Quality Analysis

The most sophisticated and academically rigorous component of the 2IA architecture is its strict evidentiary methodology. To counteract the "rumor laundering" common in influence analysis, 2IA enforces a stringent "Evidence Ladder" and precise "Confidence Labels"4.

7.1. The Evidence Ladder

The site categorizes public intelligence sources in descending order of reliability4:

1. Primary Source & Official Record: Contracts, policies, agency records, procurement files, budgets, audits, and official statements. 2IA views these as the strongest evidence for proving institutional actions, financial outlays, and obligations4.

2. Declassified Record: Diplomatic or intelligence materials, utilized with strict acknowledgment of date limits, redactions, and contextual gaps4.

3. Court Filing: Complaints, motions, exhibits, and transcripts, recognized as procedural allegations or findings rather than absolute truth4.

4. Reputable Reporting: Journalism featuring named sources and correction practices4.

5. Expert Analysis & Firsthand Accounts: Valuable for interpretation and perspective, but explicitly noted as bounded by memory and requiring corroboration. Not a substitute for underlying primary records4.

6. Unverified Claim: Leads, allegations, and partial signals. Firmly classified as the weakest source, incapable of establishing fact without support4.

7.2. Confidence Handling and Artificial Intelligence

• Confidence Labels: Every claim must be tagged as Confirmed, Corroborated, Likely, Inferred, Disputed, Stale, Unknown, or Unverified4.
• AI Handling: 2IA mandates that while AI may be used for triage (sorting, summarizing, translating), it "does not become the authority for a claim." The site explicitly warns that AI can hallucinate, flatten context, and obscure provenance, demanding reproducible human review6.

VERIFIED FACT: 2IA’s source-quality framework prevents the publication of sensationalized, unverified claims. By demanding that every major claim state what proves it, what limits it, and what would change it4, the platform inoculates itself against becoming an unwitting amplifier of adversary disinformation.

8. Global Representation

An assessment of geographic and institutional balance reveals that 2IA is highly asymmetric, focusing almost exclusively on Western legal frameworks and Anglophone civil-society institutions.

8.1. Institutional Mapping

The platform’s "Organizations Directory" categorizes entities defending civil liberties, digital rights, and open-source intelligence7.

• United States / Anglophone Presence: Heavy reliance on U.S.-based or oriented groups, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and ProPublica7.
• European / Global North Presence: Prominent inclusion of Access Now, Privacy International, Bellingcat, and the Tor Project7.
• Global Reach (Western Led): Amnesty International and Citizen Lab are cited for global human rights and spyware reporting7.

8.2. Severe Geographic Deficits

The following regions and information systems requested in the audit parameters are ALLEGATION/UNKNOWN entirely absent from 2IA's core structural analysis:

• Soviet Union / Russia: No dedicated analysis of Russian active measures, the GRU, the Internet Research Agency, or Russian domestic surveillance (SORM).
• China: Complete absence of analysis regarding the PLA Strategic Support Force, the "Three Warfares" doctrine (public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, legal warfare), or the Great Firewall.
• Other State Actors: No discussion of information environments or state-sponsored influence in France, Germany, India, Israel, Iran, Nordic systems, Latin America, Africa, or South and Southeast Asia.

DISPUTE: 2IA claims to offer "lawful public intelligence for human freedom"11. However, its methodology relies almost entirely on the United States Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), U.S. court dockets, and Western municipal procurement records11. This model is completely non-transferable to authoritarian states or conflict zones where public records laws do not exist or are routinely ignored. Therefore, 2IA exhibits an overwhelming over-reliance on Anglophone transparency mechanisms.

9. Culture and Translation Analysis

Effective psychological operations and FIMI rely heavily on exploiting cultural fissures, historical trauma, sacred symbols, and translation nuances.

9.1. Keyword Monitoring vs. Cultural Context

2IA touches upon the intersection of language and surveillance through its "Keyword Monitoring" hub. The platform correctly identifies the phenomenon of "context collapse," warning that algorithmic sentiment labels and static keyword searches frequently misread journalism, fiction, satire, translation, and protest2.

9.2. Omission of Deep Cultural IO

Beyond the technical critique of natural language processing (NLP) systems, 2IA fails to explore the humanistic elements of cultural targeting.

• There is no discussion of how adversaries map target-audience psychographics or exploit colonial context.
• The site does not address translation failures in multi-national NATO operations or the weaponization of sacred religious symbols by non-state actors.
• The analysis remains highly technical and systemic, treating influence as an algorithmic routing problem rather than a deeply sociological phenomenon.

10. Law and Oversight Analysis

The legal framework governing information operations is bifurcated into domestic civil rights law and international humanitarian law (the Law of Armed Conflict). 2IA exclusively operates within the former.

10.1. Domestic Transparency as the Primary Mechanism

2IA champions administrative law, FOIA, and public records as the ultimate levers of oversight2.

• The site provides specific routes for users facing missing contracts, fee demands, redactions, and no-records claims11.
• It explicitly targets systems of power by demanding they identify the law, policy, contract, or mandate under which they operate11.
• The "Corrections and Right of Reply" standard operationalizes fairness, allowing named individuals or institutions to confirm, dispute, narrow, or complicate the record4.

10.2. Absence of International Law

There is absolutely no discussion on 2IA regarding how the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), the principle of non-intervention, or international human rights law (e.g., the ICCPR) applies to cross-border FIMI, cyber operations, or military deception. The platform treats influence operations as a domestic media-literacy and platform-moderation issue rather than a matter of state sovereignty or international security.

11. Human-Consequence Analysis

2IA distinguishes itself through an uncompromising, trauma-informed approach to public intelligence, placing the protection of affected communities and civilian bystanders above the imperative to publish.

11.1. The Minimization Standard

The ethics hub establishes strict rules for evidence care to prevent civil-liberties research from becoming a tool of harassment5.

• Publish the Minimum Necessary: 2IA explicitly commands researchers to "cut bystanders, minors, victims, private addresses, medical details, credentials, private beliefs, and unrelated identifiers unless essential and lawful"5.
• Proportionality: The platform dictates that researchers must collect only what answers a legitimate public question, rejecting the maximum-exposure ethos common in early hacktivist or leak cultures5.
• Privacy Repair: When errors occur, 2IA mandates "downstream repair" in its Correction Ledger, ensuring that if an institution or individual is wrongly exposed, the correction travels with the same visibility as the original claim4.

VERIFIED FACT: 2IA effectively argues that exposing the system of power does not require turning bystanders into collateral damage5. This human-consequence doctrine represents a gold standard for independent open-source investigation.

12. Safety and Non-Operational-Boundary Analysis

The audit explicitly sought to verify whether 2IA provided dangerous operational material, such as live campaign plans, coercion protocols, or disinformation deployment instructions.

12.1. Strict Non-Operational Guardrails

2IA maintains absolute, bright-line boundaries preventing its research from being weaponized.

• No Coercive Influence: Section 05 of the influence hub is titled "Boundary Against Coercive Influence." The site states unequivocally that it does not provide persuasion targeting, deception scripts, intimidation tactics, bot coordination, astroturfing methods, or microtargeting workflows3.
• Authorization is a Bright Line: The site prohibits probing infrastructure, bypassing access controls, testing vulnerabilities, scraping behind limits, or trading exploits5.
• Not a Secure Drop: 2IA actively discourages the submission of classified material, stolen data, exploit code, or private personal data through its contact forms, refusing to offer "secure drop theater" without the requisite staffing and infrastructure to protect whistleblowers5.

PARTICIPANT CLAIM: 2IA asserts that it "studies the symbol without converting it into a recruitment or disruption manual" and that it "does not task collection, run sources, or provide operational intelligence support"1. The audit verifies that the public site adheres strictly to these claims.

13. Sensationalism or "Mind Control" Language Findings

Public discourse surrounding psychological operations frequently devolves into sensationalized claims of algorithmic omnipotence, brainwashing, or inescapable mind control.

13.1. Rejection of Panic and Mysticism

2IA systematically strips the mysticism from influence operations.

• The platform rejects "panic blasts" and fear-based engagement, prioritizing predictable rhythms and concrete records30.
• It explicitly states that "resilience beats panic," arguing that the proper defenses against influence are source diversity, media literacy, transparent moderation, ad libraries, and algorithmic audits, rather than unaccountable speech control or censorship3.
• By demanding "provenance before outrage," 2IA forces the reader to look at the mechanical origin of a claim (who funded it, who amplified it, what context is missing) rather than succumbing to emotional or psychological manipulation3.

INFERENCE: 2IA treats human cognitive autonomy as resilient. It views psychological operations not as inescapable magic, but as a mechanical exploitation of information architecture that can be neutralized through transparency, literacy, and structural friction.

14. Confirmed Factual Errors

While 2IA’s strict reliance on the Evidence Ladder prevents the publication of false data points, its structural framing contains categorical errors regarding military taxonomy.

1. Conflation of Civilian Misinformation with Psychological Warfare: The site’s legacy use of the /psychological-warfare/ route to house content regarding domestic media literacy, synthetic media, and platform moderation is a fundamental category error3. Psychological warfare is a specific, state-directed capability historically aimed at foreign adversaries14. Utilizing this term to describe domestic algorithmic amplification dilutes the strategic definition of actual military operations.

2. Failure to Distinguish Actor Capabilities: 2IA's "Influence Operations" hub fails to separate the capabilities of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and state intelligence services (which integrate SIGINT, HUMINT, and cyber capabilities) from low-tier non-state actors (e.g., domestic click-farms or hacktivists)24.

15. Contested Interpretations

Several of 2IA's philosophical paradigms are highly contestable when evaluated against traditional national security doctrine or international relations theory.

1. The Universality of "The Paperwork of Control": 2IA's foundational premise is that all power leaves paperwork (contracts, policies, budgets, audits)11. While accurate for Western municipal surveillance and domestic law enforcement, this premise is demonstrably false when applied to authoritarian FIMI, covert action, Special Access Programs (SAPs), or military deception, where operations are deliberately unacknowledged or leave no public-records trail17.

2. The Sufficiency of OSINT as Counter-IO: 2IA relies heavily on human-reviewed OSINT verification (timestamps, provenance, source context) to defeat synthetic media and disinformation3. Critics in the cognitive warfare domain argue that AI-generated synthetic media and high-speed bot amplification operate at a velocity that vastly outpaces manual OSINT verification, rendering 2IA's "resilience beats panic" philosophy3 potentially inadequate during acute, high-intensity information conflict.

16. Strong Pages Worth Preserving

Several components of the 2IA architecture represent best-in-class frameworks for ethical, evidence-based civil-liberties research. These should be preserved and emulated by adjacent institutions:

1. The Methodology and Evidence Ladder (/methodology/): The rigorous categorization of primary records down to unverified claims, coupled with mandatory confidence labels, creates a highly replicable model for preventing rumor laundering4.

2. Ethics and Civil Liberties Hub (/ethics-and-civil-liberties/): The codification of the "Minimization Standard" (publish the minimum necessary) and the "Authorization Is A Bright Line" rule are essential safeguards that protect civilian bystanders from OSINT overreach and prevent operational abuse5.

3. Corrections and Right of Reply (/corrections-and-right-of-reply/): The formal Correction Ledger—which distinctly separates a factual correction, a right of reply, and privacy repair—establishes a superior standard for institutional humility and downstream accountability8.

17. Missing Report Recommendations

To evolve from a domestic surveillance and media-literacy platform into a comprehensive authority capable of auditing state-level influence operations, 2IA must commission and integrate the following reports:

1. The Doctrinal Evolution of Influence (PSYOP to OIE): A comprehensive timeline detailing the institutional shift from Psychological Warfare to PSYOP, MISO, Information Operations (IO), and Operations in the Information Environment (OIE). This report must map the specific authorities granted under Joint Publications 3-13, 3-13.2, and 3-0415.

2. Historical Case Studies Archive: A series of evidence-led dossiers analyzing seminal military influence operations, including:

• World War II: The mechanics of black propaganda via Soldatensender Calais26.
• Cold War: Soviet Active Measures and Operation Denver (AIDS disinformation).
• Vietnam War: The Chieu Hoi defection program and its use of measurable behavioral metrics27.

3. Global FIMI Operations: A geographic expansion analyzing Russian, Chinese, and Iranian information manipulation models, shifting the analytical focus away from exclusively Western technology procurement and FOIA mechanisms.

18. Prioritized Remediation Plan

To address the deficits identified in this audit while strictly preserving 2IA's civil-liberties mandate and ethical boundaries, the following remediation plan is proposed:

Works cited

1. About 2IA | Mission, Freedom, Independence, and Editorial Stance – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/about/

2. Topic Hubs | 2IA Surveillance Research, Public Records, and Civil Liberties – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/topic-hubs/

3. Influence Operations and Media Literacy – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/psychological-warfare/

4. Methodology | How 2IA Verifies, Challenges Power, and Corrects – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/methodology/

5. Ethics And Civil Liberties – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/ethics-and-civil-liberties/

6. Open-Source Intelligence – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/open-source-intelligence/

7. Organizations | Civil Liberties, Digital Rights, and Public-Interest Groups – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/organizations/

8. Corrections And Right Of Reply – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/corrections-and-right-of-reply/

9. Research Archive | 2IA Surveillance Research and Public Records – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/research-archive/

10. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propaganda

11. Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/

12. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disinformation

13. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misinformation

14. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological\_operations\_(United\_States)

15. Defense Primer: Information Operations \- DTIC, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1169650.pdf

16. US Military Doctrine Treats Information and Influence as the Same Thing—and That's a Problem \- Modern War Institute, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/us-military-doctrine-treats-information-and-influence-as-the-same-thing-and-thats-a-problem/

17. HTML \- Every CRS Report, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2020-01-14\_IF10771\_0cb41b52e762f69065d5d0e36628b0ef9b920dbc.html

18. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive\_warfare

19. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political\_warfare

20. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active\_measures

21. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign\_Information\_Manipulation\_and\_Interference\#:\~:text=4%20References-,Definition,an%20intentional%20and%20coordinated%20manner.

22. Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), https://www.disinformation.ch/EU\_Foreign\_Information\_Manipulation\_and\_Interference\_(FIMI).html

23. Intelligence Support for Operations in the Information Environment: Dividing Roles and Responsibilities Between Intelligence and \- RAND, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RR3100/RR3161/RAND\_RR3161.pdf

24. HTML \- Every CRS Report, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2023-12-14\_IF10771\_8ed1fe43011e984573f1f9bca59d14744a9e2334.html

25. Handbook for Tactical Operations in the Information Environment \- RAND, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/tools/TLA700/TLA732-1/RAND\_TLA732-1.pdf

26. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soldatensender\_Calais

27. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chieu\_Hoi

28. Start Here | How to Use 2IA – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/start-here/

29. Contact – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/contact/

30. Newsletter – 2IA — Two Identities Of Anonymous, https://2ia.org/newsletter/

31. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological\_warfare